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ARTICLES

The Flurry of Tax Law Changes
Following the 2005 Hurricanes
A STRATEGY FOR MORE PREDICTABLE AND
EQUITABLE TAX TREATMENT OF VICTIMS
Patrick E. Tolan, Jr.†
I.

INTRODUCTION
Whether we face an active hurricane season, like this year, or a
below-normal season, the crucial message for every person is the
same: prepare, prepare, prepare.
—Max Mayfield, National Hurricane Center Director, May 2006.1

Although experts had predicted the increased hurricane
activity of the past two years,2 the U.S. response to the 2005
In the months
hurricanes was anything but adequate.3
†
Professor Tolan, BSEE United States Air Force Academy, J.D. University
of Michigan Law School, LL.M. George Washington University, is an Assistant
Professor of Law at Barry University Law School in Orlando, Florida, where he teaches
tax, environmental law, government contracts, and property. The author thanks
Jessica Jordan for her outstanding research in support of this article and Professors
Frank Schiavo and Stephen Leacock for their constructive advice.
1
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association [hereinafter NOAA], NOAA
Predicts Very Active 2006 North Atlantic Hurricane Season–Residents in Hurricane
Prone Areas Urged to Make Preparations, NOAA MAGAZINE, May 22, 2006,
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2006/s2634.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
2
“It appears the Atlantic Ocean is beginning to enter another active period,
posing more danger to the East Coast than the previous period of activity because of
increased population and economic development.” H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 3-4
(2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1102, 1104 (Dr. Chris Landsea, NOAA
Hurricane Research Division, testimony before the House Committee on Science).
3
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [hereinafter GAO],
EXPEDITED ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: FEMA’S
CONTROL WEAKNESSES EXPOSED THE GOVERNMENT TO SIGNIFICANT FRAUD AND ABUSE,
GAO-06-655 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-396, at 2 (2006) (“It is well-documented that the
response at all levels of government was inadequate”). It could be argued that the
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following the most destructive hurricane season the world has
ever known,4 virtually every aspect of the U.S. response has
been scrutinized.5
This article examines the tax relief
measures that were triggered by Hurricane Katrina and the
later hurricanes of 2005. Unfortunately, the tax system is not
as predictable as its meteorological counterpart.6
While the post-hurricane Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) pronouncements and the 2005-2006 legislation arguably
afforded the most generous tax relief in U.S. history,7 at the
same time it created six different classes of 2005 victims for tax
purposes. Improved tax relief should be extended equally to all
victims of disasters. Unless and until our national leaders
develop permanent, equitable tax treatment for victims of all
disasters, American businesses, especially small businesses,
and the American people, particularly the poor, are ill suited to
weather the storm.
This article begins by putting emergency tax relief in
perspective. The first half of the article is factual. Part II
provides background on the magnitude of the hurricanes of
2005 in the context of other national disasters. The section
discusses insurance as a traditional safeguard to catastrophic
magnitude of the 2005 hurricanes could not be predicted, but the record reflects
otherwise. See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO
SECURITIZE NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM RISK 1, GAO-03-1033 (2003)
(major hurricane loss to U.S. could be as high as $110 billion; major earthquake losses
could reach $225 billion).
4
FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE
KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 1, 5-9 (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED]. “Measuring
destructiveness in terms of damage to property rather than loss of life is a useful way
to compare disasters. Loss of life reflects both the magnitude of the disaster, as well as
the quality of the response, while property destruction correlates more directly to the
magnitude of the disaster alone.” Id. at 151 n.2.
5
Id. at 51-64 (discussing critical failures that undermined and prevented a
more efficient and effective federal response). See also H.R. REP. NO. 109-377 (2006);
H.R. REP. NO. 109-396 (2006) (discussing flaws in emergency response coordination and
control).
6
For a detailed examination of tropical storm prediction accuracy and
methodology, see generally JAMES L. FRANKLIN, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER–
NOAA/NWS/NCEP/TROPICAL PREDICTION CENTER, 2005 NATIONAL HURRICANE
CENTER FORECAST VERIFICATION REPORT 1 (May 21, 2006), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
verification/pdfs/Verification_2005.pdf. “Not only were the 12-72 h[our] forecasts more
accurate in 2005 than they had been over the previous decade, but the forecasts were
also more skillful.” Id. at 6.
7
The relief prompted by these tragedies continued well into 2006. See e.g.,
Rev Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61 (detailing safe harbor methods for proving
casualty losses); I.R.S. Notice 2006-67, 2006 WL 2209784 (GO Zone bonus depreciation
calculations and examples); I.R.S. Notice 2006-56, 2006-28 I.R.B. 56 (expanded
Hurricane Katrina relief for certain individual taxpayers).
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damage and dilemmas confronting the insurance and
reinsurance industries.
It then examines long-standing
casualty tax relief measures already incorporated in the
Internal Revenue Code (also referred to as I.R.C., Code, or tax
code), as well as the specific ad hoc tax implications of earlier
major national disasters.
Part III examines the tax aftermath flowing
immediately from Hurricane Katrina. Part IV looks at the
continued tax relief in response to all three major hurricanes of
2005—Katrina, Rita and Wilma. The Gulf Opportunity Zone
(GO Zone) approach and disparate treatment for victims in the
different disaster areas are also discussed in Part IV.
The second half of the article considers these
developments in terms of tax policy. The author contends that
(from a tax perspective) these 2005 catastrophes are different
in scope only, not in kind, from other catastrophes which make
some businesses unable to function, and damage or destroy
individuals’ homes and property.
Part V of the article examines which of the casualty
relief measures ought to be expanded and enhanced for future
victims and which should be abandoned. The complementary
goals of taxpayer equity and a tax code that is sufficiently
predictable to foster desired taxpayer behavior frame the
analysis.
The remainder of the article focuses on specific
proposals to improve tax treatment of casualty victims. Along
these lines, both procedural and substantive changes to the
Code are proposed. Changes beneficial to individual taxpayers,
as well as small businesses, are emphasized.
Part VI advocates permanent changes to the tax code
that would automate procedural relief. Part VII calls for a
casualty loss credit, versus a deduction, to better aid the poor.
Part VIII advocates relaxing constraints on retirement account
access for all casualty victims. Part IX proposes creation of tax
advantaged Catastrophe Savings Accounts for individuals,
businesses, and the insurance industry to encourage
safeguarding against potential losses. Part X calls for tax
credits and relief for businesses affected by any presidentiallydeclared disaster. Part XI discusses a temporary tax credit for
retroactive measures to make older buildings more impervious
to weather.
Preparation is the key to recovery for those confronted
with unparalleled hardship. For this reason, the author argues
that equity and efficiency dictate a more predictable, uniform,
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and compassionate response to all casualty victims.
Predictability is fostered by making permanent changes to the
tax code with incentives to motivate precautionary financial
and tax planning. Tax relief should complement insurance and
other federal emergency relief measures designed to allow
victims to rebuild their economic lives.8
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Bad Weather Is Nothing New

The National Hurricane Center issued more hurricane
forecasts in the Atlantic basin in 2005 than in any previous
year.9 Nevertheless, the United States should expect a major
catastrophic hurricane (Category 4 or 5)10 to make landfall
every six to seven years.11 Even weaker storm systems can
cause tremendous flood damage.12 In North Carolina, for
example, Category 2 hurricanes (as opposed to those much
stronger) account for forty-two percent of all damage.13
8
While some discussion of available relief is inevitable to demonstrate how
tax measures best complement other federal aid, a comprehensive analysis of available
federal and state emergency relief is beyond the scope of this article. For information
on Federal Emergency Relief, see generally Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 and at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
Stafford Act]. See also Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953, 958 (2005), for an excellent look at the pre-Katrina
relationship between emergency relief and tax consequences following a disaster.
9
The National Hurricane Center tracks all tropical cyclones. FRANKLIN,
supra note 6, at 5. A “hurricane” is the term used popularly for a strong tropical
cyclone in the North Atlantic Ocean—similar storms are known as typhoons in the
Northwest Pacific Ocean. Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Lab., Hurricane
Research Division, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/
A1.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
10
Hurricanes are rated on the Saffir-Simpson Scale from Category 1
(mildest; winds 74-95 mph) through Category 5 (most severe; winds greater than 155
mph). HURRICANE! 2006–A HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS BOOKLET 1, 7 (May 2006),
http://vortex.accuweather.com/adc2004/pub/images/promos/florida2004/hurricane_book.
pdf. Although Hurricane Katrina reached Category 5, it was actually lower at landfall.
See Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/
KATRINA.shtml (view the links for Monday, August 29, 2005) (last visited Jan. 9,
2007).
11
Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United
States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2005 (NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC4), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ Deadliest_Costliest.shtml (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
12
H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 1103-04 (testimony of Dr. Len Pietrafesa, North
Carolina State University, in support of the Inland Flood Forecasting and Warning
System Act of 2002).
13
Id. at 1104 (“Category 2 Hurricanes generally have a high moisture
content and cause severe . . . flooding.”).
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Mitigation measures, predominantly improved building
codes, have helped to “harden” vulnerable property.14 However,
the lure of the coast continues to bring more people and
property into the areas most likely to be affected by
hurricanes.15 Because of these predictable weather profiles and
demonstrated demographic trends, the risks from hurricanes
will always be present.16
Hurricanes are only one form of natural disaster.
Tornados, earthquakes, wild fires, blizzards, volcanoes,
landslides, mudslides, flooding and hail storms also wreak
havoc. Other disasters, such as Tsunamis, could potentially
threaten the United States, though the threat, historically, has
been comparatively minor.17
According to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), flooding, severe storms, and hurricanes are
the most common and costly causes of disaster declarations in
the United States.18 “[A]t least ten such events since 1989 have
each required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion
dollars.”19 However, all disasters, not just those disasters
meriting presidential attention, leave lives in ruin and
personal devastation for their victims. Because these smaller
tragedies are vastly more numerous, they continue to impact
tens of thousands of Americans each year.20
14
See generally Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, Senior Vice President & Chief
Economist of the Ins. Info. Inst., Presentation to the Wharton Risk Management and
Decision Processes Center Roundtable, The Lessons of Hurricane Andrew: Is Florida
Really
Ready?
(June
11,
2002),
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/
686021_1_0/hurricanestudy.pdf.
15
For example, in the past twenty-five years, “communities along the . . .
East Coast have dramatically increased development . . . despite the knowledge that a
hurricane or large tropical storm could cause significant damage to property and life.”
H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 1104. See also Ins. Info. Inst. [hereinafter I.I.I.], Hurricanes:
Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/ hurricanes (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007) (property values in coastal areas doubled over past decade).
16
Forecasters have long predicted a “damaging period of frequent storms”
that could cost more than $110 billion if it hit New England. H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at
1104. See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-526, at 18, 19 (2000) (testimony in support of
Homeowners’ Insurance Availability Act of 2000).
17
“[T]he frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low,
compared with other natural hazards.” GAO, U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS: FEDERAL
AND STATE PARTNERS COLLABORATE TO HELP COMMUNITIES REDUCE POTENTIAL
IMPACTS, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 10, GAO-06-519 (2006). According to
NOAA, the last significant tsunami struck Skagway, Alaska, in 1994 causing “one
death and $25 million in damages.” Id. at 10-11.
18
Id. at 11.
19
Id.
20
Press release, American Red Cross, Survey Reveals Americans Not as
Prepared as They Think (May 23, 2006), http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/
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In the United States, catastrophic disasters causing at
least $25 million in direct damages occur on average about
twice a month.21 While the major hurricanes of 2005 captured
all of the media attention, over the same timeframe, the
American Red Cross responded to a record 72,883 disasters,
most of them fire-related.22 “Fire kills more Americans each
year than all other disasters combined.”23
Whether the disaster is large or small, man-made or
natural, if it hits you, it hurts you. Few would argue that the
victims of arson or terrorist attacks are any less worthy of tax
relief than the victims of a natural disaster. Who can forget or
ignore the tragedy and loss of September 11, 2001? Because
disasters harm whomever they strike, all victims of casualty
losses should be treated equally under the tax code.
B.

Insurance as a Safeguard

Insurance as a means of protection against perils has
been around for hundreds of years.24 Standard insurance for
perils such as fires, vandalism, burglary, or theft has
historically been available to homeowners as part of their basic
Homeowners’ policies typically insure
policy coverage.25
against some severe weather damage, such as wind and hail
coverage, but the insurance against water damage from storms
is seriously limited.26 Much of the catastrophic damage from
0,1077,0_314_5398,00.html [hereinafter “American Red Cross”] (last visited Jan. 9,
2007).
21
Lipman, supra note 8, at 958 (citing I.I.I., Catastrophes: Facts and
Statistics: Insured Losses for U.S. Catastrophes 1994-2003, http://www.iii.org/media/
facts/statsbyissue/catastrophes/ (last visited Jul. 3, 2004)). The most recent data
confirms this frequency in 2004-2006. I.I.I., Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics: Insured
Losses for U.S. Catastrophes 1997-2006, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/
catastrophes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
22
American Red Cross, supra note 20.
23
Christina Ward, Quiet Disasters: House Fires Destroy Lives Every Day, RED
CROSS. ORG., Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/fires/010406house
fires.html.
See also U.S. Fire Administration, USFA National Fire Statistics,
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/national/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
24
See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 31-33 (1870) (discussing
evolution of maritime insurance over the past ten centuries).
25
See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4029). See also I.I.I., Hot Topics & Issues
Updates, Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, (March 2007), http://www.iii.org/media/
hottopics/insurance/xxx [hereinafter Catastrophes: Insurance Issues] (commercial
policies generally cover the same causes of loss, but vary somewhat based on coverage
selected).
26
See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, (S.D.
Miss. 2006) (policy precluded damage from flooding and storm surge during Hurricane
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hurricanes results from flood damage due to the storm surge
and heavy rains.27 Unfortunately, most policies contain an
express “flood exclusion.”28
Flood insurance has not been commercially available
through the private insurance industry “[b]ecause of the high
risks and the lack of under-writing standards.”29 Therefore, in
1968, Congress created a voluntary National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) underwritten by the federal government.30
Over the years, the federal government assumed responsibility
for providing relief and for partial indemnification for property
losses resulting from floods.31
Historically, floods have been one of the most
destructive national hazards facing the people of the United
States.32 The year 2005 was no exception. In Louisiana alone,
Hurricane Katrina caused over $38 billion in flood and storm
surge damage, most of it uninsured.33 Louisiana was also
hardest hit with insured Katrina-related losses of over $24
billion.34
For decades, Congress has been “acutely aware of the
national need for a reliable and comprehensive flood insurance

Katrina, but covered damage caused by wind).
The I.I.I. indicates a typical
homeowners policy contains a provision stating, “We do not pay for loss to the interior
of a building or to personal property inside, caused by rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust
unless the wind or hail first damages the roof or walls and the wind forces rain, snow,
sleet, sand or dust through the opening.” Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, Senior Vice President
& Chief Economist of the I.I.I., Presentation, Hurricane Season of 2005: Impacts on US
P/C Insurance Markets In 2006 & Beyond 1, 145 (Mar. 2006), http://server.iii.org/
yy_obj_data/binary/744085_1_0/katrina.pdf [hereinafter Hartwig, Impact of 2005
Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets].
27
For example, Hurricane Katrina damages due to storm surge and flooding
were estimated at $44 billion, compared to $38 billion for all other property damage.
Hartwig, Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra note 26, at
36, 48.
28
Id. at 146.
29
S. REP. NO. 93-583 at 3219 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321719.
30
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 4001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001).
See also S. REP. NO. 93-583, at 3219.
31
See S. REP. NO. 93-583, at 3220.
32
GAO, CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM,
Highlights, GAO-03-606T (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03606t.pdf.
33
Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, Presentation to Baton Rouge Press Club, Louisiana
Insurance Market Overview: Beyond Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 1, 26 (May 15, 2006),
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/754699_1_0/louisiana.pdf [hereinafter Hartwig,
Beyond Katrina].
34
Id. at 42 (includes $1.47 billion in flood-damaged vehicles covered by
comprehensive policies).
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program”35 because as many as ninety percent of all natural
disasters in this country involve flooding.36 However, as
demonstrated in 2005, Congress has yet to strike the right
balance with the NFIP.37
In 2006 testimony before Congress, the Comptroller
General declared the NFIP program “essentially bankrupt.”38
Congress agreed to a $17 billion bailout of the NFIP39 and
began crafting legislation to improve the capacity of the
program to deal with the most significant catastrophes.40
The NFIP is broken for a variety of reasons. Most who
need flood insurance do not purchase it.41 Premiums are also
“woefully inadequate given the technical bankruptcy of the
NFIP.”42 Even for homeowners who do insure, because of
subsidies, homeowners do not bear the true share of costs
35

S. REP NO. 93-583, at 3218.
GAO, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM, GAO-06-119 (2005). See also JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX POLICY
OPTIONS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, CONG. RES. SERVICE (C.R.S.) RL33088 (Sept. 16,
2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53669.pdf.
37
GAO, FISCAL EXPOSURES: IMPROVING THE BUDGETARY FOCUS ON LONGTERM COSTS AND UNCERTAINTIES, GAO-03-213 (2003) (federal insurance exposes
government to future, potentially significant, unbudgeted costs).
38
GAO, HURRICANE KATRINA: GAO’S PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
REGARDING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 1, 38, GAO-06-442T (2006).
“The magnitude and severity of the flood losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
overwhelmed the ability of the NFIP to absorb the costs of paying claims, providing an
illustration of the extent to which the federal government is exposed to claims coverage
in catastrophic loss years.” Id.
39
National Flood Insurance Program Further Enhanced Borrowing
Authority Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-106, 119 Stat. 2288 (Nov. 2005) (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 4016(a)) (increasing maximum loan from $3.5 to 18.5 million), amending
National Flood Insurance Program Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-65, 119 Stat. 1998 (Sept. 2005) (increasing maximum loan from $1.5 to $3.5
million).
40
H.R. REP. NO. 109-410 (to accompany H.R. 4973, Flood Insurance Reform
and Modernization Act of 2006). As this article went to press in Spring 2007, four Bills
addressing flood insurance issues were pending in the 110th Congress: H.R. 91,
Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2007 (mandating GAO study of NFIP and
Hurricane-Related Flooding); H.R. 920, Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 2007
(expanding NFIP to also cover damage from hurricanes, tornados, cyclones, typhoons or
other windstorms); H.R. 921, Flood Insurance Community Outreach Grant Program
Act of 2007 (authorizing FEMA to make grants to poor communities to encourage flood
insurance); H.R. 922, National Flood Insurance Program Participation Evaluation Act
of 2007 (requiring GAO to study NFIP participation); http://www.thomas.gov (enter
“flood insurance”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
41
“More than 11 million U.S. homes are in flood zones,” but “[o]nly about one
in four homeowners who live in areas vulnerable to floods purchase federal flood
insurance.” Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25.
42
Hartwig, Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra
note 26, at 138.
36
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associated with their risks.43 In this regard, subsidies, like
federal emergency relief itself, could actually stimulate
overdevelopment of risky areas.44
For property damage covered by private insurance,
eight of the ten most costly catastrophes in the history of the
United States were the result of hurricane activity.45 The
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack was the only man-made
disaster of similar magnitude.46 The Northridge, California
earthquake of 1994 rounds out the list.47 Notably, seven of the
ten most costly hurricanes occurred in 2004-2005.48
43

DR. L. JAMES VALVERDE, JR., DIRECTOR, ECONOMICS, AND RISK
MANAGEMENT, I.I.I., MANAGING NATURAL DISASTER RISK: WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PLAY? 1, 5 (Jan. 2006), http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/
749407_1_0/Disaster_Risk.pdf (“[F]ederal insurance programs are rarely actuarially
sound”).
44
See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25. See also Hartwig,
Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra note 26, at 15, 57.
“Overdevelopment of high risk areas is encouraged by public subsidies, as are
catastrophe losses that people fail to mitigate and insure.” Homeowners Insurance
Availability in Disaster Prone Areas: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Opportunity, 105th Cong. 33 (1997) (statement of Dr. Robert
W. Klein, Dir. of Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. and Ins. Res., Georgia State Univ.),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba41548.000/ hba41548_0.HTM#0.
45
I.I.I., Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/
statsbyissue/catastrophes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
46
It was the worst in terms of fatalities (2976), and property losses exceeded
$20 billion. Id.
47
In 2006 dollars, damage is estimated at $18-27 billion. I.I.I., Earthquakes:
Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/earthquakes/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
48
In 2007, the Insurance Information Institute published the following data
on its website:
The Ten Most Costly Hurricanes in the United States ($ Millions)
Estimated insured loss (1)
Rank

Hurricane

Dollars when occurred

1

Katrina (2005)

$40,600

In 2006 dollars (2)
$41,910

2

Andrew (1992)

15,500

22,272

3

Wilma (2005)

10,300

10,632

4

Charley (2004)

7,475

7,978

5

Ivan (2004)

7,110

7,588

6

Hugo (1989)

4,195

6,820

7

Rita (2005)

5,627

5,809

8

Frances (2004)

4,595

4,904

9

Jeanne (2004)

3,440

3,671

10

Georges (1998)

2,900

3,587

(1) Property coverage only.
(2) Adjusted to 2006 dollars by the Insurance Information Institute.
Source: ISO; Insurance Institute
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Due to insured losses hitting record proportions,
Congress began considering federalizing reinsurance of the
hurricane insurance market.49 Despite the fact that many in
the private insurance industry are opposed to such
federalization (citing ability to withstand the highest loss years
on record with sufficient policy reserves),50 there is open debate
in the industry about the need for federal reinsurance.51 As the
debate over how to structure catastrophic insurance lingers, no
one disputes the need for homeowners to have access to
affordable insurance.
Currently, fifty-nine percent of homeowners are
uninsured or underinsured.52 With the real estate boom of the
early twenty-first century, most home owners in coastal areas
could find themselves woefully underinsured. Regardless of
whether the government or private industry offers insurance,
tax relief measures should serve as incentives for people to
carry adequate insurance.53
In summary, while individuals can affordably insure
against most perils with their property coverage carrier, some
risks may be so unpredictable and of such great magnitude as
to be beyond the scope of typical private insurance.54
Supplemental major catastrophe insurance (flood insurance,
earthquake insurance, and, perhaps in the near future,
hurricane insurance or other “mega-catastrophe” policies) must

I.I.I., Hurricanes: Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/
hurricanes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
49
See, e.g., H.R. 846, 109th Cong. (2005) (federal auctions of catastrophe
reinsurance contracts); H.R. 4366, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4507, 109th Cong. (2005)
(allowing States with catastrophe insurance programs to purchase federal
reinsurance).
50
See generally Is America’s Housing Market Prepared for the Next Natural
Catastrophe: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Opportunity 109th Cong. (June 28, 2006) (statement of Dennis C. Burke, Vice
President
of
State
Relations,
Reinsurance
Assoc.
of
Am.),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/062806dcb.pdf.
51
VALVERDE, supra note 43, at 4-5. See also Is America’s Housing Market
Prepared for the Next Natural Catastrophe: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Opportunity 109th Cong. (June 28, 2006) (statement of Alex
Soto, on Behalf of the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/062806as.pdf (lack of insurance industry
consensus hampering pending legislation).
52
Hartwig, Beyond Katrina, supra note 33, at 110 (although the numbers
have improved in the past few years, most homes are still undervalued by 22%).
53
Indeed, one of the goals of the Stafford Act is “encouraging individuals,
States, and local governments to protect themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to
supplement or replace governmental assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4) (2000).
54
VALVERDE, supra note 43, at 3.
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be separately obtained. Regrettably, too few Americans secure
this additional coverage.55
As discussed in the next two sections, tax relief for
victims of disaster is a relatively new phenomenon. Congress
must take care that such relief encourages prudent decisions
(such as motivating individuals to obtain sufficient insurance—
including flood insurance for those at risk), versus exacerbating
a false sense of security that a government bailout could
promote.56
C.

Tax Relief for Victims of All Casualties

With any hurricane or other substantial disaster,
property is lost and residents are often displaced from their
Some victims receive
homes and possibly their jobs.
government or charitable aid in the form of food, shelter, or
In addition to the turmoil of the
even outright cash.57
moment—safeguarding family members and trying to put their
lives back together—taxpayers may be confronted with lost or
destroyed records. Paying their taxes may be the last thing on
their minds.
Fortunately, the federal government has historically
afforded some relief to victims of all casualties.58 The principal
provision allowing compensation for property loss is Code
Section 165, which allows a tax deduction for casualty losses.59
In addition to losses due to storms, the Code allows relief for
fires, shipwreck, theft, or other casualties.60 Section 165
extends broadly to those suffering a great variety of casualty
losses; entitlement to this deduction is independent of any

55
For example, it is estimated by the insurance industry that “[o]nly 13% of
[California] homeowners buy earthquake insurance.” Hartwig, Beyond Katrina, supra
note 33, at 67.
56
See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25 (illustrating that the
damage Katrina caused “has triggered a reexamination . . . of how the United States
deals with the financial consequences of such massive property damage and personal
loss”).
57
See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 1.
58
For an excellent discussion of the pre-2005 tax treatment of disasters, see
Lipman, supra note 8.
59
I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2006). All sections of the Internal Revenue Code
(“I.R.C.” or “Code”) are codified in Title 26 of the U.S. Code. All references to the Code
are current as of March 2007.
60
For individuals, deductible losses must be incurred in a trade or business,
derive from some other profit-seeking activity, or, except as provided in subsection (h),
arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, theft, or other casualty. I.R.C. § 165(c).

810

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

nationally declared emergency.61 A disadvantage is that it is
only available to taxpayers who itemize and is subject to other
limitations reducing its efficacy. The drawbacks of Section 165
are discussed in more detail in Part VII, infra.62
The IRS has long recognized that government payments
to individuals on the basis of need also promote the public
welfare.63 Despite the statutory presumption that (unless
otherwise excluded) all accessions to wealth constitute income
pursuant to Section 61 of the Code, the IRS has acknowledged
that welfare payments need not be reported as income.64 Note
that unemployment compensation is a replacement for income
versus a welfare payment, and thus remains taxable.65
Disaster relief is a type of welfare payment, because it
helps individuals and families who are put in need based on
the emergency confronting them.66 “The assistance that a
government grants its citizens who sustain personal injury and
property damage as the result of hurricanes, tornadoes,
earthquakes, and other natural disasters is motivated by its
obligation to assist in alleviating the suffering and damage
caused by the disaster.”67
The “need” for the welfare is established by the
emergency circumstances prompting the disaster relief and is
independent of the taxpayer’s income.68 After the terrorist
bombings of September 11, 2001, Code Section 139 was
promulgated to codify that recipients are not taxed on qualified
disaster relief payments.69 Further, reimbursements paid by
61

But see id. § 165(i) (timing advantage in declared emergency).
See notes 354-78 and accompanying text.
63
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (social benefit program
payments not includible in income). Note, emergency grants to businesses are not tax
exempt. Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B. 120.
64
Rev. Rul. 74-205, supra note 63. See also I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, 2002-2
C.B. 917, Questions and Answers: Q-1–A-2, (tax-exempt grants following Sept. 11,
2001).
65
I.R.C. § 85; Rev. Rul. 79-299, 1979-2 C.B. 32.
66
Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (disaster relief in interest of general
welfare—not income); Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (relocation payments for
moving from flood-damaged residence not taxable).
67
Rev. Rul. 76-144, supra note 66.
68
I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, supra note 64 (Nonessential, decorative, and luxury
items fall outside the gambit of necessary disaster-related expenses.).
69
I.R.C. § 139 (Qualified disasters include presidentially-declared disasters,
disasters from terrorist or military activity, disasters resulting from accidents
involving common carriers, or other events determined by the Secretary to be
catastrophic. Amounts paid by federal, state, or local governments determined to
warrant assistance are also not taxable.). The general welfare policy was codified, but
not supplanted by I.R.C. § 139. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, supra note 64.
62
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state agencies, charities, or employers, for expenses incurred by
those assisting in emergency relief efforts, are likewise
excluded from gross income.70
There is more flexibility in the tax code for victims of
presidentially-declared disasters than for victims of other
casualties.71 Section 165(i) allows victims of presidentiallydeclared disasters an election to take the deduction for casualty
losses in the immediately preceding tax year.72
The benefit of the preference is two-fold. Allowing the
option to choose the year to take the deduction allows the
taxpayer the benefit of selecting whatever tax year yields a
better result (the earlier tax year may well reflect greater
income due to the lack of catastrophic interruption—therefore
relief for the earlier period may well be from a higher marginal
tax rate). Even where the amount would be identical, making
the election affords earlier tax relief for the loss.
The Code also allows other advantages for victims of
presidentially-declared tragedies.73 For example, Code Section
7508A allows the Secretary of the Treasury discretion to
disregard deadlines for filing and payment of taxes in declared
It states: “In the case of a taxpayer
disaster areas.74
determined by the Secretary to be affected by a Presidentially
declared disaster . . . the Secretary may specify a period of up to
1 year that may be disregarded in determining . . . [whether
filing or payment of tax]75 were performed within the time
70

Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283.
“Declared” is used throughout as an equivalent to “presidentiallydeclared.” Both relate to areas declared by the President to be National Disaster Areas
pursuant to § 401 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. § 5170).
72
I.R.C. § 165(i)(1) (The election is irrevocable after ninety days). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.165-11 (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.165-11). All sections of the Treasury Regulations
are codified in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulation and are current as of March
2007.
73
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1033(h) (favorable treatment of insurance proceeds and
doubling of time to replace involuntarily converted property). See infra notes 99-105
and accompanying text.
74
I.R.C. § 7508A.
75
I.R.C. § 7508(a) allows the following relief:
71

(A) Filing any return of income, estate, gift, employment, or excise tax;
(B) Payment of any income, estate, gift, employment, or excise tax or any
installment thereof or of any other liability to the United States in respect
thereof;
(C) Filing a petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of a deficiency, or
for review of a decision rendered by the Tax Court;
(D) Allowance of a credit or refund of any tax;
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prescribed . . . the amount of any interest, penalty, additional
amount, or addition to the tax . . . [and] the amount of any
credit or refund.”76
When the Secretary has not exercised this discretion or
when the taxpayer fails to qualify as an “affected taxpayer” in
the declared disaster region, the IRS will consider extensions
and abatement of late payment penalties on a case-by-case
basis.77 Code Sections 6081 and 6161 allow the Secretary
discretion to extend deadlines for a reasonable time not to
exceed six months.78
D.

Tax Relief for Specific Disasters

Some victims of particular disasters have been granted
additional tax relief. The following sections detail tax relief
afforded to the victims of some noteworthy recent disasters.
The discussion is not exhaustive, but illustrates representative
responses to major disasters, as well as the trend toward
increased emphasis on tax relief. It is appropriate to examine
previous assistance to gauge how tax relief could best be used
in the future.

(E) Filing a claim for credit or refund of any tax;
(F) Bringing suit upon any such claim for credit or refund;
(G) Assessment of any tax;
(H) Giving or making any notice or demand for the payment of any tax, or
with respect to any liability to the United States in respect of any tax;
(I) Collection, by the Secretary, by levy or otherwise, of the amount of any
liability in respect of any tax;
(J) Bringing suit by the United States, or any officer on its behalf, in respect
of any liability in respect of any tax; and
(K) Any other act required or permitted under the internal revenue laws
specified by the Secretary[.]
Id.
76

I.R.C. § 7508A (emphasis added).
Internal Revenue Manual 25.16.1.1 (2003). For example, if a taxpayer
arranged for a loan to pay taxes due on his business, but the bank scheduled to close on
the loan was not open due to severe damages, the IRS would consider abatement “using
reasonable cause criteria.” Id.
78
I.R.C. §§ 6081, 6161.
77
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1. Hurricane Hugo (1989)
Although no legislative tax relief was provided to the
victims of Hurricane Hugo, the IRS afforded victims some
procedural as well as substantive relief.
For example,
taxpayers in disaster areas were granted extensions of time to
file and pay taxes where the deadlines were otherwise
imminent.79
Further, for those taxpayers who had already received
six-month extensions (so that Sections 6081 and 6161
precluded further extensions), the Secretary determined
categorically that these affected taxpayers were deemed to
have reasonable cause for late filing so that late filing penalties
would automatically be waived, so long as returns were
postmarked and payment made before the extended date.80
Taxpayers were directed to flag the return for special handling
by marking “HUGO” on the top center of the return.81
Taxpayers with addresses outside the designated disaster area
were told they “should also include a brief statement as to how
Hugo affected them.”82
Congress provided cost-sharing assistance to the victims
of Hurricane Hugo for the purposes of encouraging tree owners
to reestablish stands of trees.83 The Secretary of Agriculture
was charged to develop and implement a program to provide
financial assistance to owners of private timber stands
damaged in 1989 by Hurricane Hugo.84 The assistance was
only for those living in counties declared by the president to be
Hurricane Hugo disaster areas and those living in contiguous
counties.85 The law created a benefit of up to $50,000 based
upon a federal cost-share (including labor) of seventy-five
percent of total cost to the victim.86

79

I.R.S. Notice 89-136, 1989-2 C.B. 451-52.
Id. (waiving penalties under I.R.C. § 6651 and noting that statutory
interest could not be waived). See also I.R.S. Notice 89-107, 1989-2 C.B. 445
(considering “taxpayers affected by Hurricane Hugo as having reasonable cause for late
filing” and payment of excise taxes related to pension and employee benefit plans).
81
I.R.S. Notice 89-107, supra note 80.
82
Id.
83
Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2235(b), 104 Stat. 3359, 3960 (1990).
84
Id. at 3960.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 3961.
80
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Congress also authorized $65 million to help persons
engaged in commercial fisheries.87 This relief was much more
flexible and included direct relief to victims as well as indirect
relief through States and local governments and nonprofit
organizations, “for measures to alleviate harm incurred as a
direct result of a fishery resource disaster.”88 The relief was not
limited to Hurricane Hugo disaster areas, but also included
damages arising from later hurricanes (specifically, Andrew
and Iniki), “or any other natural disaster.”89 Such relief was
“first-come, first-serve” since amounts appropriated were only
available until expended.90
While Congress used both of the aforementioned
measures to afford targeted relief to challenged business
sectors, neither employed the tax code as the means to
effectuate this relief.
2. Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (1992)
Hurricane Andrew caused $15.5 billion in insured
damage (over $20 billion in 2006 dollars) and was the costliest
natural disaster in U.S. history before Hurricane Katrina.91
“With peak wind gusts of almost 200 mph, the hurricane
flattened whole communities”, destroying thousands of homes
and businesses, battering crops, and “leaving in its wake a
wasteland of debris.”92 Within weeks, Typhoon Omar struck
the tiny Island of Guam and Hurricane Iniki roared across
Hawaii, the worst hurricane to hit the Hawaiian Islands in a
century.93
In addition to the aid to commercial fisheries discussed
above, Congress authorized federal agencies to “accept gifts of
property, money, or anything else of value.”94 The new law
directed agencies to “establish written procedures to implement
this program” and authorized agencies to accept gifts
designated for individual employees.95 It allowed donations
87
Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9135, 106 Stat. 1876 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
4107 (d)(1) (2000)).
88
16 U.S.C. § 4107(d)(1) (2000).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Hurricane Facts and Statistics, supra note 48.
92
Id.
93
See Proclamation No. 6491, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,553 (Oct. 14, 1992).
94
Pub. L. No. 102-368, § 901, 106 Stat. 1117, 1156 (1992).
95
Id.
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“from non-Federal sources for extraordinary and unanticipated
expenses incurred by agency employees in their personal
capacity within the areas designated as [national] disaster
areas.”96
The Congress also provided explicit tax relief to these
disaster victims.97 It retroactively afforded relief to victims of
presidentially-declared disasters after September 1, 1991.98
Significantly, the new law afforded victims of declared
emergencies four years (versus two years) to replace their home
and its scheduled contents without recognizing a taxable gain.99
Congress also created tax advantages for insured individuals to
the extent their principal residence and its contents were
destroyed (involuntarily converted) as a result of a declared
disaster.100
Specifically, the law allowed an exclusion from income
of any and all gain from insurance proceeds paid on
involuntarily converted personal property that was not
identified on a specific insurance schedule.101 Most household
goods—furniture, clothing, appliances, foodstocks, etc.—qualify
Furthermore, the law
for this special tax treatment.102
generously provided that all other insurance proceeds would be
treated as a single item in calculating nonrecognition of gain.103
In a subsequent Revenue Ruling, the Service
determined that all costs to replace a qualifying victim’s house,
plus its scheduled and unscheduled contents, would be
compared with the lump sum insurance proceeds from the
converted house and scheduled converted property only
(thereby excluding the entire recovery for unscheduled
property from the gain calculation).104 In that case, the
taxpayer, who had received $300x insurance on his house, $10x
in scheduled proceeds, and $35x in unscheduled proceeds,

96

Id.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13431,
107 Stat. 312, 567 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1033(h) (2005)).
98
Id. § 13431(b). This benefit would include victims of Hurricanes Andrew
and Iniki, Typhoon Omar, any other declared disasters occurring in 1992, and all
subsequent disasters.
99
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(B).
100
Id. § 1033(h)(1)(A).
101
Typically only high value items, such as jewelry, furs, silverware, or
collectibles are scheduled. See generally Rev. Rul. 95-22, 1995-12 I.R.B. 4.
102
Id.
103
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii).
104
Rev. Rul. 95-22, supra note 101.
97
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needed to spend only $310x to purchase a replacement dwelling
and all of its contents.105
The IRS was even more active in 1992 than it was after
Hurricane Hugo. Like the 1989 relief, the IRS granted
extensions of time to file and pay taxes up to the maximum
permissible leeway under Code Section 6081 and waived late
payment penalties under Code Section 6651(a)(2).106 Taxpayers
were directed to flag the return for special handling by
marking “ANDREW”107 or “INIKI” on the top center of the
return.108 Taxpayers with addresses outside the designated
disaster area were told they “should also include a brief
statement as to how the disaster adversely affected their
ability to meet their tax obligations.”109 The IRS also afforded a
new type of relief: it suspended for thirty days all normal
collection and examination actions for affected taxpayers in the
disaster areas.110
In addition to this individual relief, the IRS announced
that it would expedite review of applications for tax exempt
status by groups newly formed to aid the disaster victims.111 It
also indicated it would not raise issues concerning approved
charitable organizations that might otherwise affect an
organization’s qualification for tax exempt status—such as an
organization rendering assistance in good faith to its own
employees who were victims of the disasters.112 Finally, for
designated counties and parishes impacted by Hurricane
Andrew, the IRS provided relief from certain low income
housing credit requirements.113

105

Id.
I.R.S. Notice 92-40, 1992-2 C.B. 371; I.R.S. Notice 92-44, 1992-2 C.B. 373.
107
I.R.S. Notice 92-40, supra note 106.
108
I.R.S. Notice 92-44, supra note 106.
109
I.R.S. Notice 92-40, supra note 106; I.R.S. Notice 92-44, supra note 106.
110
I.R.S. News Release IR-92-88 (Aug. 28, 1992); I.R.S. News Release IR-9291 (Sept. 16, 1992).
111
I.R.S. Announcement 92-128, 1992-38 I.R.B. 42 (Sept. 8, 1992); I.R.S.
Announcement 92-140, 1992-41 I.R.B. 75 (Sept. 24, 1992).
112
I.R.S. Notice 92-45, 1992-2 C.B. 375.
113
I.R.S. Notice 92-43, 1992-2 C.B. 373 (authorizing relief from carryover
allocations under I.R.C. § 42(h)(1)(E) and recapture under § 42(j)(4)(E)).
106
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3. Northridge (Los Angeles) Earthquake (1994)
The Northridge Earthquake was the second most costly
U.S. natural disaster before Hurricane Katrina.114 Measuring
6.8 on the Richter scale, the quake “jolted the San Fernando
Valley, 20 miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles, on
January 17, 1994.”115 The Northridge earthquake caused more
than sixty deaths and 12,000 injuries.116 It destroyed 8,000
homes and damaged more than 114,000 buildings.117 According
to the Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS), it
caused $15.3 billion in insured losses.118
The Congress provided no tax relief to the disaster
victims. The IRS relief was similar to, but less extensive than,
the relief to the 1992 hurricane victims. Like the earlier relief,
the IRS granted extensions of time to file and pay taxes, but
the extension was only for ten calendar days.119 The IRS also
suspended normal collection and examination actions for two
weeks (versus thirty days for affected taxpayers in the 1992
hurricane disaster areas).120 Finally, the IRS announced that it
would expedite review of applications for tax exempt status by
groups newly formed to aid the disaster victims, and it would
not raise certain issues concerning charitable organizations
that might affect an organization’s tax exempt status.121
Following Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki, and the
Northridge Earthquake, the states of Florida, California, and
Hawaii intervened to prevent a near total collapse in their
respective homeowners’ insurance markets.122 Perhaps these
state bail-outs averted the need for serious discussion of federal

114
Hartwig, Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra
note 26, at 13.
115
Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
I.R.S. News Release 1994 WL 14750 (Jan. 19, 1994) (IRS Offices to Provide
Disaster Tax Assistance).
Taxpayers were directed to mark the return “LA
EARTHQUAKE.” Id.
120
I.R.S. News Release IR-92-88, supra note 110; I.R.S. News Release IR-9291, supra note 110; I.R.S. News Release 1994 WL 14750, supra note 119.
121
I.R.S. Notice 1994-7 I.R.B. 54, 1994-1 C.B. 337.
122
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-526. Other risk-prone states lacking state
insurance programs saw applications to state FAIR (Fair Access Insurance
Requirements) plans and beach plans (markets of last resort for homeowners’
insurance which generally provide less coverage at a greater price) “increase
dramatically during the last half of the 1990s.” Id.
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tax relief. In any event, other than the limited relief discussed
above, no tax relief was spawned by these mighty tragedies.123
4. September 11, 2001—Tax Relief and Creation of the
Liberty Zone
Although not much tax relief had been provided to
victims of natural disasters, the Congress was quick to pass
legislation in the form of federal tax relief for the victims of
9/11. The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001124
granted the victims of these atrocities substantial tax relief,
including (among other things): relief from income taxes (at a
minimum, $10,000);125 exclusion of certain death benefits;126
estate tax reduction;127 exclusion of disaster relief payments;128
and exclusion of certain cancellations of indebtedness.129 It also
allowed payments by charitable organizations to be treated as
exempt payments.130 Finally, the Act delegated authority to the
IRS to postpone certain deadlines for up to one year in cases of
natural disaster, and both military and terrorist attacks.131

123
Perhaps the most notable byproduct of Hurricane Andrew was the call for
better building codes and better enforcement of existing codes.
Catastrophes:
Insurance Issues, supra note 25, at 19.
124
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat.
2427 (2002) (codified as amended at scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
125
Id. at § 101 (codified at I.R.C. § 692). The IRS allowed full abatement of all
tax liability for tax years 2000 and 2001 for victims killed in the attacks. I.R.S. News
Release IR-2002-07 (Jan. 23, 2002). At the same time, the IRS forgave the tax liability
for 1994 and 1995 for the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing. Id.
126
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 102, 115 Stat. at 2429
(codified at I.R.C. § 101).
127
Id. § 103 (codified at I.R.C. § 2201).
128
Id. § 104 (codified at I.R.C. § 139). I.R.C. § 139(b)(4) codifies the general
welfare exclusion for qualified disaster relief payments to individuals. I.R.S. Notice
2002-76, 2002-2 C.B. 917. Because of extraordinary circumstances surrounding such
disasters, the IRS anticipates that individuals will not be required to account for actual
expenses so long as the amount of relief is commensurate with the anticipated
expenses incurred. Id.
129
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 105, 115 Stat. at 2432
(codified at I.R.C. § 108).
130
Id. § 104 (codified at I.R.C. § 501).
131
Id. § 112 (codified at I.R.C. § 7508A).
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The tax benefits for the New York Liberty Zone132 also
included substantial tax advantages for Liberty Zone
businesses:
employment credits;133 bonus and accelerated
depreciation and increased expensing for qualified Liberty Zone
property;134 tax exempt bond advantages;135 and an extension
from two to five years for nonrecognition of gains for property
involuntarily converted (where replacement property is in the
Liberty Zone).136 Some of the tax advantages for individuals
and businesses foreshadowed a similar Congressional response
to the massive 2005 hurricane disasters.
As might be expected, the IRS granted extensions of
time to file tax returns.137 Unlike the extensions discussed
above, however, which preceded enactment of Code Section
7508A, the IRS took full advantage of its discretion by coupling
its ability to disregard time under Section 7508A with its
ability to extend the deadlines for filing and payment under
Sections 6081 and 6161.138 Under the then existing state of the
law, Section 7508A allowed 120 days to be disregarded, which
the IRS allowed to run consecutively with a six month
extension for all affected taxpayers.139 The IRS later clarified
that interest, as well as penalties, would be waived.140
The term “affected taxpayers” was also broadly
construed to include all victims on the four commercial
hijacked aircraft or on the ground during the crashes; all
workers assisting in relief efforts, regardless of whether
132
“‘New York Liberty Zone’ means the area located on or south of Canal
Street, East Broadway (east of its intersection with Canal Street), or Grand Street
(east of its intersection with East Broadway) in the Borough of Manhattan in the City
of New York, New York.” I.R.C. § 1400L(h). Liberty Zone businesses are those
employing no more than 200 employees which rebuilt in the footprint of the terrorist
bombings of Sept. 11, 2001 (commonly thought of as ground zero) as well as any
businesses damaged or destroyed by the attacks that relocated anywhere else within
New York City. I.R.C. § 1400L(a)(2)(C), (h).
133
See I.R.C. § 51.
134
See I.R.C. § 168(k)(2).
135
See I.R.C. § 1400L(d), (e).
136
These business advantages are codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 1400L.
137
I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. 305.
138
Id.
139
Id. See also Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 38, 149 (increasing maximum relief from 90 to
120 days). Earlier in 2001, in response to the New Mexico wildfires, the IRS had
similarly construed its § 7508A authority to run consecutively (versus concurrently)
with its extension authorities under §§ 6081 and 6161. I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1
C.B. 989.
140
I.R.S. Notice 2002-40, 2002-1 C.B. 1152 (based on new authority from
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001).
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affiliated with a recognized government or philanthropic relief
organization; and all those who work (or used to work) in the
declared disaster area.141 In addition, taxpayers experiencing
transportation or mail or delivery service disturbances
resulting from the terrorist attacks were afforded an extension
until November 15, 2001.142
In terms of relief to helping organizations, the IRS
again agreed to expedite tax-exempt status requests.143 The
IRS also agreed to treat any payments made in good faith to
the victims or their surviving family members as “related to
the charity’s exempt purpose,” so long as the payments were
made using objective standards.144 [This relief presumably
overcomes the necessity of showing that the recipients are
“needy,” consistent with the purpose for which many charitable
organization exemptions have been approved (for example the
Salvation Army), and also allows charities to overcome the
501(c)(3) prohibition that an organization be operated
exclusively for public purpose and that no part of the benefits
inure to any private individual].145
5. Hurricanes Ivan, Charley, Frances, and Jeanne (2004)
While the 2004 hurricane season was, at that time, the
most expensive ever,146 the widespread loss did not lead to any
federal legislative tax relief. However, the IRS exercised its
discretion to grant relief for several declared disasters,
including Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, and
Tropical Storm Bonnie.147 The IRS granted extensions of time
to file and pay taxes;148 relief from deadlines involved in Section
1031 like-kind exchange transactions;149 and, a suspension of
141

I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, supra note 137.
Id.
143
I.R.S. News Release IR-2001-82 (Sept. 18, 2001).
144
I.R.S. Notice 2001-78, 2001-2 C.B. 576.
145
See generally S. REP. NO. 107-211, at 53-54 (2002) (proposed CARE Act of
2002, payments by charitable organizations to victims of war on terrorism).
146
Blake et al., supra note 11.
147
See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-108 (Aug. 16, 2004) (extending time
to file and pay taxes for areas affected by Bonnie and Charley); I.R.S. News Release IR2004-115 (Sept. 10, 2004) (extending time to file and pay taxes for Hurricane Frances);
I.R.S. Notice 2004-62, 2004-2 C.B. 565 (additional relief for areas affected by Bonnie,
Charley, and Frances); I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, 2004-2 C.B. 878 (relief from certain
requirements due to Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne).
148
I.R.S. News Releases IR-2004-108 and IR-2004-115, supra note 147; I.R.S.
News Release IR-2004-118 (Sept. 22, 2004).
149
I.R.S. Notice 2005-3, 2005-1 C.B. 447.
142
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the income limitations (ordinarily required for occupants of
low-income housing) to allow landlords of such property to
provide temporary lodging to individuals displaced by
Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.150
In Florida, after the devastating 2004 hurricane season,
the notion of a hurricane savings account was first
introduced.151 The hurricane savings account was forecast “to
cover an insurance deductible or other uninsured portion of the
risks of loss from a hurricane, rising flood waters, or other
catastrophic windstorm event.”152 Because they would only be
created to safeguard homesteads, the accounts would be beyond
the reach of creditors.153 However, benefits of such an account
are not realized unless or until the federal government creates
such a tax-exempt or tax-deferred savings vehicle.154
III.

HURRICANE KATRINA AND ITS TAX AFTERMATH

A.

The IRS Response

The IRS response to Hurricane Katrina was swift and
sustained. Within days of the disaster, the IRS Commissioner,
Mark Everson, announced deadline extensions to those with
taxes otherwise coming due.155 Through Everson, the IRS
pledged, “We will do everything we can to help taxpayers,
business and tax professionals while ensuring the smooth
continuity of our nation’s tax system.”156 In the following thirty
150
I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; see also I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, 20042 C.B. 875 (relief in Alabama due to Ivan); I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, 2004-2 C.B. 876
(relief in Ohio due to post-hurricane severe storms and flooding).
151
Florida Staff Analysis, S.B. 660 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at Westlaw (Find
by Citation: Florida Staff Analysis, S.B. 660; Florida Staff Analysis, S.B. 660, 2/8/2005).
152
Florida Senate Journal, 2005 Reg. Sess., No. 14 (Apr. 13, 2005), available
at Westlaw (Find by Citation: FL S. Jour., 2005 Reg. Sess., No. 14; run search).
153
FLA. STAT. § 222.22 (2006). This statute exempts hurricane savings
accounts and other preferred savings programs from legal process. However, this
benefit attaches only when “the federal government provides tax-exempt or taxdeferred status to a hurricane savings account.” Id. § 222.22(4)(c).
154
Id. § 222.22. Although the federal government has not yet created such a
favored tax position, Florida’s congressional delegation has filed legislation in Congress
which would give hurricane savings accounts preferential tax treatment. See H.R.
4836, 109th Cong. (2006). Benefits of such an account are discussed in Part IX, infra.
155
I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-84 (Aug. 30, 2005). Note that relief was
further extended to February 28, 2006, by direction of Congress. See infra note 221
and accompanying text.
156
Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, I.R.S., Treasury Press Conference on
Hurricane Tax Relief (Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=147372,00.html (Prepared Remarks to Accompany IR-2005-96).
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days, the IRS kept its promise, issuing twenty-nine News
Releases, Announcements, and Notices extending relief.157
The immediate relief in the wake of the hurricane was
timely and essential, because many important books and
records had been lost or destroyed due to the widespread
devastation and massive flooding.158 In addition, where records
miraculously survived, those who were evacuated often had no
immediate access to them.159
B.

Legislative Response

The House and Senate were quick to rally to support
relief of the hurricane victims. House Resolution 3768 was
passed on September 15, 2005 and contained a number of tax
relief measures: 1) lifting a three-year requirement for
mortgage revenue bonds; 2) allowing persons providing housing
to dislocated persons an additional deduction (exemption) of
$500 for each dislocated person housed; 3) exempting
forgiveness of indebtedness from income; 4) allowing expanded
work opportunity tax credits to employers in the disaster area;
5) enabling persons to access individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) or pension accounts without tax penalty (and with an
opportunity to reinvest as if the money were rolled over); and,
most significantly, 6) eliminating the ten percent Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI) threshold and $100 reduction from the
casualty loss deduction.160
A similar Senate Bill, S. 1696, was passed on the same
date, but was later vitiated by Senate passage of H.R. 3768, as
amended by the Senate.161 The original Senate Bill differed in

157
The count is derived from a Westlaw search of the Federal Taxation – IRS
Cumulative Bulletins and Federal Tax–IRS News Releases databases from Aug. 30 to
Sept. 29, 2005 (enter “Hurricane Katrina” as the search term).
158
See Rodney C. Runyan, Small Business in the Face of Crisis: Identifying
Barriers to Recovery from a Natural Disaster, 14 J. OF CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT.
12 (2006).
159
Id. at 13.
160
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the House bill to cost over
$5.2 billion, with the casualty loss deduction the single largest item at over $2.4 billion.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 3768, Doc. No. JCX65-05 R, (Sept. 15, 2005) [hereinafter JCX-65-05].
161
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 3768, THE
“KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005,” Doc. No. JCX-69-05 As Passed by the
House and the Senate on September 21, 2005, at 1 (Sept. 22, 2005) [hereinafter JCX-6905].
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that it also included a forty percent tax credit162 for employers
of retained workers, included an enhanced deduction for food163
and book164 donations, and mandated an extension of tax filing
deadlines.165 These provisions were carried forward in the
amended version of H.R. 3768. Provisions in S. 1696 “dealing
with IRS information sharing and taxpayer assistance . . . were
dropped in the compromise.”166
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA)
was signed by President Bush and became law on September
23, 2005.167 It captured the proposed tax relief contained in
H.R. 3768 as amended by the Senate.168 KETRA Title I creates
special rules for using retirement funds. Title II allows
employment relief. Title III contains incentives for charity.
The final Title creates miscellaneous additional benefits.
These benefits are discussed in detail in the sections that
follow. The price tag for KETRA in foregone revenue is
estimated at $6.1 billion.169
1. Retirement Fund Access
Individuals who sustained economic loss from the
hurricane and whose primary residence is located in the
Hurricane Katrina disaster area170 may withdraw, without
162
S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 202(a) (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
163
S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 303 (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
164
S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 304 (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
165
S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 403 (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
166
Wesley Elmore, Tax Analysts, Inc., Senate Approves Compromise
Hurricane Tax Relief Legislation, Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://www.pgdc.com/
uga/item/?item ID=300670.
167
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016
(2005) [hereinafter KETRA].
168
Subsequent minor concurring changes were approved by both Houses.
Legislation following the later 2005 hurricanes supplements or subsumes the KETRA
relief. See infra notes 223-81 and accompanying text.
169
DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, MAJOR TAX ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, CONG.
RES. SERV. (C.R.S.) RL32719 (updated Dec. 8, 2005).
170
Defined as “an area with respect to which a major disaster has been
declared by the President before September 14, 2005, under section 401 of the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act by reason of Hurricane
Katrina.” KETRA § 2. Note, S. 1696 would have allowed a tax code change to I.R.C. §
72, allowing penalty-free withdrawals for any presidentially-declared national
emergency area. S. 1696, 109th Cong. §101 (2005) (Hurricane Katrina Tax Relief Act of
2005) (unanimously passed Sept. 15, 2005; later vitiated the same day).
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penalty,171 up to $100,000 from an eligible retirement plan.172
These plans include individual retirement accounts,173
annuities,174 and qualifying deferred compensation plans175 and
trusts.176 Any money withdrawn from eligible plans that
constitutes income remains taxable; however, the individual
may spread the income over a three year period.177
Individuals who receive qualified Hurricane Katrina
distributions may make one or more replacement contributions
within three years of receiving the distribution and treat any
Unless the
amounts repaid as a qualified rollover.178
repayment is made before any income tax is due, the individual
would need to amend her return once repayments are made.179
A victim may also borrow up to $100,000 from a
qualified employer plan [I.R.C. § 401(a) or § 403(a) or (b)
plan].180 This is double the amount of the traditional maximum
loan that can be excluded from treatment as a distribution.181
Relaxing these limits allows the taxpayer to access the funds
without adverse tax consequences, providing the taxpayer
agrees to repay over five years.182 In calculating the repayment
period, the time from August 25, 2005, to December 31, 2006, is
disregarded for all qualified victims with loans outstanding.183
Together, these measures should afford quick access to
cash for many middle class victims.
Most low-income
taxpayers probably do not have substantial retirement reserves
and many high-income taxpayers probably do not need this
relief. Nevertheless, the measures afford a creative and

171

I.R.C. § 72 generally imposes a ten percent penalty on early withdrawal.
KETRA § 101.
173
I.R.C. § 408(a).
174
I.R.C. §§ 403, 408(b).
175
I.R.C. § 457(b).
176
I.R.C. § 402(c)(8)(A).
177
KETRA § 101(e) presumes the income will be spread, unless the individual
elects to have it taxed lump sum in the year received. Id.
178
Id. § 101(c)(1). To qualify, repayments must be made to an eligible
retirement plan “in an aggregate amount not to exceed the amount of [the]
distribution.” Id.
179
See generally I.R.C. §§ 6072, 6161.
180
KETRA § 103(a). As defined in I.R.C. § 72(p)(4), “qualified employer plan”
means plans governed by I.R.C. §§ 401(a) and 403(a) and (b). Relief pertaining to
minimum funding standards for a plan to remain qualified was also granted. I.R.S.
Notice 2005-84 (Oct. 29, 2005).
181
See I.R.C. § 72(p)(1)-(2).
182
KETRA § 103(b).
183
Id.
172
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important mechanism for those who need improved cash flow
and can benefit now while repaying later.
2. Employment Relief
Two important tax credits were promulgated in KETRA
as incentives to employers. The first was available to all
employers who hire “Hurricane Katrina employees;” the second
was initially only available to small businesses184 located in the
Hurricane Katrina core disaster area.185 The first credit was a
special application of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit
(WOTC).186 The second was a new form of tax credit aimed
uniquely at the businesses that had to shut down, at least for
one day, due to Hurricane Katrina.187 The provisions are highly
complementary: one rewards employers in the disaster area
who retained and paid their employees; the other rewards any
business who picked up those workers who lost their jobs.
The WOTC allows businesses a credit of forty percent of
the first $6,000 of wages paid to any member of any targeted
As applied to Hurricane Katrina employees, it
group.188
provides a credit to businesses within or outside the core
disaster area who hire employees whose principal place of
abode is either within the core disaster area or who have been
displaced from a principal abode in the core disaster area due
to the hurricane.189 Any Katrina employees hired between
August 28, 2005, and August 27, 2007, by a business located in
the core disaster area qualify for the credit.190 For employers
outside the core disaster area, only displaced employees hired
before December 31, 2005, are considered Hurricane Katrina
employees.191
The original KETRA Employee Retention Credit had
more strings attached. To qualify, a business must have
184
KETRA § 202(c) (limiting eligible businesses to fewer than 200 employees)
was repealed by the Gulf Zone Opportunity Act of 2005, and was replaced with an
identical credit for eligible businesses of any size. GO Zone Act of 2005 § 201, I.R.C. §
1400R(a)(2)(A). For full citation information of the GO Zone Act, see infra note 223.
185
KETRA defines “core disaster area” more strictly than “Hurricane Katrina
disaster area” to limit eligibility to those areas determined by FEMA to warrant
individual or individual and public assistance. KETRA § 2.
186
See I.R.C. § 51.
187
KETRA § 202(b)(1).
188
I.R.C. § 51(a), (b)(3).
189
KETRA § 201.
190
Id. § 201(b)(1).
191
Id. § 201(b)(2).
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employed fewer than 200 employees and must have been
located in a core disaster area on August 28, 2005.192 The
business must have become inoperable between this date and
January 1, 2006, as a result of damages from Katrina.193 The
business must also have had employees who worked in the core
disaster area before the hurricane and who were paid wages
between August 29, and December 31, 2005.194
For employers meeting all of these requirements, the
tax relief is very similar to the WOTC credit. The qualifying
business can claim forty percent of the first $6,000 for each
retained employee.195 For a company retaining a large number
of workers, the relief could be substantial. For example, a
company retaining 150 workers could potentially claim a
$360,000 credit.
The credit amount is based upon “qualified wages,”
however, so is thereby limited to wages paid after the business
became inoperable and before the business resumed significant
operations.196 Thus, if a business was only shut down for two
days and payroll to each eligible employee was $50 per day, the
credit would only be $6,000, versus $360,000 based on the
example above. This additional restriction is sensible given the
circumstances because it prevents a business only incidentally
impacted from receiving a windfall.
3. Incentives for Charity
Following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, charities raised
more than $2.5 billion.197 This amount rivals the $2.7 billion in
donations following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
Despite the near record levels of giving, the
2001.198
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted some
difficulties in coordination between government relief efforts
and charitable relief efforts, and among the various charitable
The GAO also identified
organizations themselves.199
192

Id. § 202(b)(1), (c).
Id. § 202(b)(1)(B).
194
Id. § 202(b)(3).
195
KETRA § 202(a).
196
Id. § 202(b)(3).
197
GAO, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: PROVISION OF CHARITABLE
ASSISTANCE 2, GAO-06-297T (2005).
198
Id. at 3.
199
Id. at 7. See also GAO, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: COORDINATION
BETWEEN FEMA AND THE RED CROSS SHOULD BE IMPROVED FOR THE 2006 HURRICANE
193
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significant shortfalls in the appropriate use and accountability
of $126 million in international assistance.200
KETRA contains six general charitable incentives or
rewards.
Two are significant—the temporary lifting of
deduction limitations for charitable donations and the
additional exemption for those housing displaced individuals—
and will be dealt with in greater detail below. The other four
are more minor. The mileage rate for charitable use of a
vehicle was substantially increased.201 In the alternative,
reimbursement for charitable use of a vehicle to provide
Hurricane Katrina relief was excluded from income.202 Donors
of books to public schools were given explicit relief from
downward adjustments of the deduction (to offset capital gains
as required by Section 170(e)).203 Finally, businesses were
encouraged to donate food inventory (up to ten percent of the
businesses’ aggregate income) before December 31, 2005.204
KETRA Section 302, the additional exemption for
housing individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina, provides
perhaps the most novel tax relief. It allows a $500 exemption
in 2005 or 2006 for each Katrina victim taken in.205 The
maximum reduction of income for any taxpayer is limited to
Relief is restricted to
$2,000 (four displaced persons).206
situations where the taxpayer does not receive rent from the
displaced individual (or any other amount from any source) in
connection with providing the housing.207 Also, the displaced

SEASON 3, GAO-06-712 (2006) (differing views about responsibilities hampered efforts
to coordinate federal mass care assistance).
200
See GAO, HURRICANE KATRINA: COMPREHENSIVE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE USE OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 3, GAO-06-460 (2006). As of March 16, 2006, $60 million
remained undistributed and there were no plans for use of $400 million of pledged and
expected donations. Id. at 10, 12.
201
Compare I.R.C. § 170(i) (14 cents per mile), with KETRA § 303 (70% of
standard business rate—yielding 32 cents per mile). I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2005-78 (Dec. 2,
2005).
202
KETRA § 304.
203
While undoubtedly prompted by the need to restock public schools
following Katrina, tax relief was not limited to donations to those affected by Hurricane
Katrina. Id. § 306(a). However, the December 31, 2005, termination eliminates its
utility for future crisis situations. Id. § 306(b).
204
Id. § 305.
205
Id. § 302.
206
Id. § 302(b)(1).
207
Id. § 302(c).

828

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

individual cannot be the spouse or dependent of the taxpayer.208
Note that there is no restriction on other relatives.209
The final incentive to charitable donations was a lifting
of the ceiling on charitable deductions.210 The ceiling is
typically ten percent of a corporate taxpayer’s taxable income211
or one-half of an individual taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.212
KETRA also lifts the overall limitation on itemized deductions
for individuals in Code Section 68.213 KETRA allows these
ceilings to be ignored for any individual charitable
contributions made after August 28, 2005, and before
December 31, 2005.214 Unlike the tax relief for individuals, for
corporations to qualify, the contribution must be earmarked for
Hurricane Katrina relief.215
4. Additional Relief
Several types of additional targeted tax relief were also
authorized.
The casualty deduction was improved by
eliminating the $100 reduction and the ten percent AGI
threshold for Katrina victims;216 the rules for determining
earned income were relaxed;217 special rules were crafted to
enable hurricane disaster areas to qualify as targeted areas for
mortgage revenue bonds;218 the time period to avoid recognition
of a capital gain upon involuntary conversion of real property
(by purchasing suitable replacement property) was extended to

208

KETRA § 302(c)(3).
Id. With respect to taxable years 2005 and 2006, the Secretary has
authority to ensure that taxpayers do not lose any deduction or credit, or experience a
change of filing status, by reason of temporary relocations caused by Hurricane
Katrina. Id. § 407. Of course, only one taxpayer may claim an individual as a
dependent.
210
KETRA § 301; see I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (limiting most charitable deductions
to 50% of the taxpayer’s contribution base); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (limiting other
charitable deductions to 30% of the taxpayer’s contribution base). Ordinarily, excess
donations may be carried forward for the next five years. I.R.C. § 170(d).
211
I.R.C. § 170(b)(2).
212
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (B). The taxpayer’s contribution base is AGI,
computed without regard to any net operating loss carryback. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F); see
also I.R.C. § 172.
213
KETRA § 301(c).
214
Id. § 301(a), (d)(1)(A).
215
Id. § 301(d)(1)(B).
216
Id. § 402.
217
Id. § 406.
218
Id. § 404.
209
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five years for Hurricane Katrina victims;219 victims whose debt
was forgiven were allowed to exclude such relief from income;220
and Congress required the IRS to extend filing and payment of
taxes for those in the disaster area until at least February 28,
2006.221
IV.

GO ZONE RELIEF AND SELECTIVE RELIEF FOR VICTIMS
OF HURRICANES RITA AND WILMA

KETRA opened the door to wide-ranging tax relief for
hurricane victims. After the continued devastation wrought by
Hurricanes Rita and Wilma over the following weeks, it would
hardly be fair to ignore the needs of the new victims. However,
when the later hurricanes struck, Congress had not yet passed
the long-term tax incentives it was working on for Hurricane
Katrina victims.222 The tax relief for those affected by the later
hurricanes was therefore wrapped into the more far-reaching
relief for those affected by Hurricane Katrina. Although this
approach had the tremendous advantage of expediting relief to
the victims of the later catastrophes, a layer of complexity was
added, because the relief was not uniform for all victims and all
areas.
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone Act)
was passed on December 15, 2005, and signed on December 21,
2005.223 The “core disaster area” for Hurricane Katrina was
renamed the “Gulf Opportunity Zone,” or “GO Zone,”224 and
similar tax advantaged areas were established for the victims
of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma—the “Rita GO Zone”225 and
“Wilma GO Zone.”226 As with the initial KETRA relief, only
those areas determined by the President to warrant individual

219
Compare KETRA § 405, with I.R.C. § 1033(h). Property is involuntarily
converted when seized, stolen, condemned, or destroyed. I.R.C. § 1033(a).
220
KETRA § 401(a).
221
Id. § 403(b).
222
Before Rita struck, the President had announced a desire to create an
opportunity zone for redevelopment, and Congress was working to pass such
legislation. Grassley Says Next Relief Package Will Focus on Long-Term Tax
Incentives, TAX NOTES TODAY (Falls Church, Va.), Sept. 23, 2005 [hereinafter Grassley]
(“We’re looking at depreciation changes, tax-exempt bond authority, tax-exempt bond
refunding, and enterprise-zone initiatives.”).
223
Pub. L. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (codified at I.R.C. §§1400M-1400T)
[hereinafter GO Zone Act].
224
See id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(1); KETRA § 2(2).
225
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(3).
226
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(5).
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or individual and public assistance from the federal
government qualified for special GO Zone tax benefits.227
Title II of the GO Zone Act expressly extended certain
tax relief measures adopted for Hurricane Katrina to
These measures directly
Hurricanes Rita and Wilma.228
parallel the KETRA relief and are summarized in Section A.
The GO Zone Act also created new tax relief and incentives.
Section B details the new tax relief common to all of the
disasters. Section C examines the unique new relief for certain
victims of Hurricane Katrina.229 In addition to the credits and
incentives discussed above, Congress included additional tax
breaks in the GO Zone Act as an economic stimulus for the
redevelopment of those areas hardest struck by Hurricane
Katrina.
A.

Tax Relief Expanded to Victims of Rita and Wilma

Special rules for use of retirement funds first adopted in
KETRA were extended to also include individuals who
sustained economic loss from Hurricanes Rita and Wilma.230
Victims whose primary residences were located in the
designated Hurricane Rita and Wilma disaster areas may also
withdraw, without penalty, up to $100,000 from an eligible
retirement plan.231 As in KETRA, individuals may prorate
income over three years,232 repay within three years (and
characterize the distribution as a rollover),233 or, if preferred,
borrow up to $100,000 from their employer retirement savings
plan and repay within five years.234
The GO Zone Act broadly enhanced charitable giving
incentives.235 To enjoy relief from the limitations on charitable
giving, corporate taxpayers were allowed to make contributions
to relief efforts supporting any of these three hurricanes.236
227

Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(1), (3), (5).
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. §§ 1400Q-1400T.
229
Note, some of the victims of Hurricane Katrina were also victims of
Hurricane Rita; if they qualify for individual or individual and public relief due to
Katrina, these measures protect them. Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(1).
230
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q.
231
GO Zone Act § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q. As in KETRA, I.R.C. § 402(c)(8)(B)
defines a qualified retirement plan.
232
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q(a)(5)).
233
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q(a)(3).
234
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q(c).
235
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(a).
236
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(ii).
228
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Individual taxpayers enjoyed tax relief, so long as cash
donations were made after August 28, 2005, and before
December 31, 2005, regardless of whether the donations were
linked to hurricane relief.237
Those suffering casualty losses (Code Section 165)
attributable to Hurricanes Rita and Wilma were allowed the
same relief from the ten percent AGI and $100 reductions on
casualty losses as allowed to the Katrina victims.238 The dates
of the losses necessarily needed to correspond to the periods
after the respective hurricanes made landfall.239
Special rules for determining earned income related to
the Earned Income Credit and the refundable component of the
Child Tax Credit were likewise afforded to “qualified
individuals” in the Wilma and Rita disaster areas.240 As with
the Hurricane Katrina victims, to qualify, the individual had to
either be displaced from his or her principal place of abode by
the hurricane, or had to qualify for individual or individual and
public assistance from the federal government.241
Finally, procedural relief was extended to the new
victims in the Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Wilma disaster
areas. Congress required the Secretary of the Treasury to
extend under Code Section 7508A the period for filing and
payment of taxes (and other tax-related deadlines) to all
taxpayers in the three declared disaster areas, “for a period
ending not earlier than February 28, 2006.”242
B.

New Tax Relief—All GO Zones

Other than the benefits discussed above, no additional
benefits were created for individual taxpayers affected by the
later hurricanes. However, some limited additional business
benefits were created for all of the GO Zones.
Special rules were crafted for mortgage revenue bonds
to finance owner-occupied residences within any of the three
GO Zones.
Most significantly, the maximum amount of
qualifying home improvement loans was increased from
$15,000 to $150,000 where proceeds were used to repair homes
237
238
239
240
241
242

GO Zone Act § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(i).
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(b).
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(b).
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(d)(2)(C), (D).
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(d)(2)(C), (D).
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(c).
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located in the GO Zones.243 The GO Zone Act also reflected “the
sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury, or the
Secretary’s delegate, should designate one or more series of
[U.S. savings] bonds or certificates . . . as ‘Gulf Coast Recovery
Bonds’ in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.”244
Employee retention credits245 of up to forty percent of the
first $6,000 paid per retained employee were extended to
eligible employers in the GO Zone, the Hurricane Rita GO
Zone,246 and the Hurricane Wilma GO Zone.247 The new
provision effectively repealed the similar KETRA provision
(discussed in Part III.B.2).
Significantly, the KETRA
limitation—that the credit was not available to large
businesses—was removed.248 It is also worth noting that the
Work Opportunity Tax Credit,249 which had been offered to
those hiring Hurricane Katrina employees (including displaced
employees), was not extended to employers hiring those
affected by the later hurricanes.250
Code Section 168(k) allows a taxpayer a thirty percent
depreciation allowance for qualifying property placed in service
after September 10, 2001, and before January 1, 2005.251 The
GO Zone Act created discretionary authority for the Secretary
to extend the “placed in service date” for any property to
qualify for bonus depreciation, so long as the property was
manufactured and placed in service within one of the three GO
Zones by a person affected by the hurricanes.252 The Secretary
is to exercise this discretion on a “taxpayer by taxpayer basis,”
but in no event is the Secretary to extend the period by more
than one year.253
Small timber producers in all three GO Zones got a
boost from the Act.254 Those taxpayers holding under five

243

GO Zone Act § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400T(a).
Id. § 301.
245
Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400R.
246
Id. §§ 101(a), 201(a), I.R.C. §§ 1400M(3), 1400R(b).
247
Id. §§ 101(a), 201(a), I.R.C. §§ 1400M(5), 1400R(c).
248
Compare id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400R, with KETRA § 202(c).
249
I.R.C. § 51 (discussed supra Part III.B.2).
250
See KETRA § 201. Katrina employees were identified as members of a
targeted group under I.R.C. § 51 for purposes of this credit; the deadline for hiring
displaced workers was Dec. 31, 2005. Id.
251
I.R.C. § 168(k).
252
GO Zone Act § 105.
253
Id.
254
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C § 1400N(i).
244
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hundred acres of qualified timber property,255 any part of which
lies within a GO Zone, may carry net operating losses back five
years and characterize the losses as farming losses; increased
expensing is also allowed.256
Finally, for housing purposes, all three GO Zones are to
be treated as “difficult development areas” under Section 42 of
the Code.257 The designation facilitates Low-Income Housing
Credits for any property placed in service in these areas from
2006 through the end of 2008.258 Note that the credit is
increased for the hurricane Katrina GO Zone.259
C.

Katrina Unique GO Zone Benefits
1. Enhanced Education Tax Credits

In this second wave of legislation, Congress provided an
enhanced education tax credit, for tax years 2005 and 2006, for
students who attended educational institutions in the Gulf
Opportunity Zone.260 This relief effectively doubled the Hope or
Lifetime Learning tax credit amounts for individuals under
Code Section 25A.261 It also relaxed the definition of “qualified
tuition and related expenses” so that room and board expenses
Such relief would be especially
could be considered.262
important to the thousands of students who had to transfer
temporarily to other institutions.
2. Economic Stimulus for the GO Zone
a. Bonds and Community Development Credits
Congress authorized nearly $8 billion in tax-exempt
bond financing for the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama.263 Such bonds were allowed to be used to pay for
construction of residential rental projects, for construction (or

255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

See I.R.C. § 194(c)(1).
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(i).
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(c)(3).
Id.
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(c)(1).
Id. § 102(a), I.R.C. § 1400O.
Id.
GO Zone Act § 102(a), I.R.C. § 1400O.
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(b).
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reconstruction or improvement) of nonresidential real property,
or for public utility construction in the GO Zone.264
Seven hundred million dollars in additional tax credits
were created for redevelopment of the GO Zone.265 The new
markets tax credit was available only to qualified community
development agencies making qualified low-income community
investments within the GO Zone.266
b. Housing Incentives
As noted above, the GO Zone was included as a difficult
development area and was also singled out for enhanced lowincome housing credit. In the past, the IRS had granted
similar relief under its discretionary authority pursuant to
I.R.C. Section 42(n).267 Such relief was available in response to
a request from the affected State.268 The statutory relief
obviated the need for the state to come forward and request it.
The GO Zone tax-relief measures also included a tax
credit for employer-provided housing.269 The credit is equal to
thirty percent of the amount excludable from the gross income
of qualifying employees [up to $600 per month] for lodging
furnished by the employer from January 1, 2006, to July 1,
2006.
c. Other Business Incentives
Businesses in the GO Zone are entitled to a special
depreciation allowance for GO Zone Property placed into
service from August 28, 2005, through the end of 2007 (2008 for
nonresidential real property and residential rental property).270
Fifty percent of the adjusted basis of the property (adjusted
basis is typically the property’s cost) can be written off the first

264

Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(a)(4).
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(m).
266
Id. § 102(a), I.R.C. § 1400O.
267
See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147 (describing relief in Florida
from damage due to Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne); I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, supra
note 150 (describing relief in Alabama from damage due to Ivan); I.R.S. Notice 2004-75,
supra note 150 (describing relief in Ohio due to post-hurricane storms and flooding).
268
See generally I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; I.R.S. Notice 2004-74,
supra note 150; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150 (describing state requests).
269
GO Zone Act § 103(a), I.R.C. § 1400P(a), (b), (f).
270
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(d).
265
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year, plus ordinary depreciation can then be taken on the
remaining fifty percent.271
The amount of immediate tax relief is also substantially
enhanced because of increased expensing allowances for
durable business property.272 The limits under Code Section
179 are increased by up to $100,000 on the capital property
(otherwise required to be depreciated over time) that can be
deducted in the immediate year as a current expense.273
Taxpayers are also allowed to elect to take up to fifty
percent of any GO Zone clean-up cost as a deduction for the
taxable year in which the cost is incurred.274 They can also
deduct one hundred percent of any environmental remediation
costs, including remediation of hazardous substances as well as
petroleum products, in the year clean-up costs are incurred.275
To qualify for either of these special provisions, the clean-up
must be conducted before December 31, 2007.276
The rules regarding GO Zone casualty losses are
incredibly generous. Instead of the typical two-year carryback
period,277 the Act allows a five-year carryback for any “qualified
Gulf Opportunity Zone loss.”278 This term is defined as the
lesser of (1) net operating loss (NOL) minus ten-year carryback
loss,279 or (2) the sum of GO Zone casualty losses, plus
deductions of moving expenses paid to vacate a home as a
result of Katrina, plus amounts paid to temporarily house
employees, plus depreciation of GO Zone property, plus cleanup and repair costs due to Katrina.280
In addition to the sweeping relief described above,
special tax treatment is also extended to designated industries.
For example, the public utility industry is afforded more
generous casualty loss relief.281

271
Id. For a $100,000 machine, the qualifying taxpayer would receive a
$50,000 depreciation bonus.
272
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(e); see also I.R.C. § 179(b).
273
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(e); see also I.R.C. § 179(b).
274
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(f).
275
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(g).
276
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(f), (g).
277
I.R.C. § 172(b)(1).
278
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(k).
279
I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(C).
280
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(k)(2).
281
Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(j).
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IMPROVING TAX POLICY THROUGH PREDICTABILITY AND
VICTIM EQUITY

There are two principal contentions in the materials
that follow: (1) those meritorious tax measures designed to aid
the victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma should be
improved and expanded to reach victims of all casualties, and
(2) these beneficial changes should be incorporated into the tax
code so that financial and tax planning can be more
predictable. The discussion looks not only at what has been
done, but also at what could be done, including measures
currently proposed. Equity and predictability serve as the
barometers for the analysis.
Although some of the tax relief measures flowing from
the 2005 hurricanes should be abandoned, many should be
extended to victims of all casualties, and some of the relief
measures should go even further to improve both horizontal
and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity is treating similarly situated
taxpayers in a similar manner.282 Vertical equity ensures
fairness among taxpayers with different income levels.283
Under our progressive tax system, vertical equity requires that
taxpayers in lower brackets bear less of the tax burden than
those with higher incomes (and presumably more ability to
pay).284
There are a number of difficulties in applying tax relief
and incentives to provide relief to victims of disasters. For
example, tax benefits are not easily targeted to lower income
Also, unbridled tax relief is akin to
individuals.285
unconstrained federal spending—they both can break the bank.
That being said, if these difficulties can be surmounted,
then tax relief could be used to improve the dire circumstances
of a great many Americans at a time when they are facing
perhaps their lives’ greatest tragedy.
To insure fiscal
responsibility, the relief should be carefully tailored to
maximize the benefits to those most in need. To better
appreciate the proposals in the parts that follow, the remainder
282
David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006).
283
JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS 25 (3d ed. 2005).
284
Id. at 15, 17-25.
285
GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 2.
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of this section focuses on the flaws in the recent hurricane tax
incentives and the present tax regime.
While noble in its attempts to afford relief to the
numerous victims of the disasters, Congress’ ad hoc legislative
response to the 2005 hurricanes resulted in measures either
too broad or too narrow to constitute effective tax policy. In
particular, tax-related relief from Congress and the Internal
Revenue Service has been voluminous and at times redundant,
complex, and confusing.286 Legislators and bureaucrats have
not always been on the same page.287 Now that the waters have
settled, it is fitting to examine the lessons learned.
To receive the optimal benefit, money must quickly
reach those who have been devastated the most. The true way
to “fast-track” relief is to approve it now for all future victims.
Congress should work closely with the IRS to foster ready
implementation of appropriate tax relief to reach those
businesses and individuals most affected. The trigger for such
recovery should be both predictable and equitable.
Even though the specific answers to the tax relief
problem should be the focus of further academic and
Congressional discussion, now is the time to acknowledge the
problem and begin the debate. The following suggestions may
offer hope of a more promising and beneficial future.288
A.

Incentives for Charitable Donations Aided the Wealthy
and Were Inadequately Linked to Relief for Those Struck
by the Tragedy

Charity for those in need is a virtue,289 and the
charitable outpouring that flowed from the hurricanes was

286

The two new laws affording a myriad of tax relief measures (KETRA, supra
note 167, and GO Zone Act, supra note 223) were accompanied by no fewer than eighty
IRS pronouncements in the months following Katrina. The count is derived from
searches for the term “Hurricane Katrina” in the Westlaw databases Federal Taxation
– IRS Cumulative Bulletins and Federal Tax – IRS News Releases databases.
287
See, e.g., infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
288
Note that deliberation about tax relief for victims of catastrophes is
warranted, even if the income tax is replaced with a flat tax or consumption tax.
Jerome Kurtz, Two Cheers for the Income Tax, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 161, 165-66 (2001)
(noting political impracticality of Congress refusing tax relief to disaster victims under
any tax system).
289
See, e.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, pt. 3, § 1, ch. 1, art. 7, ¶¶ 182229, available at http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect1chpt1art7.htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2007).

838

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

remarkable.290 However, it was more likely the magnitude of
the disasters, rather than the promise of additional tax relief,
that prompted most of this widespread generosity.291 Indeed,
most of the donations from within the United States were made
before KETRA was passed,292 and $126 million worth of aid was
donated from abroad.293 Clearly, none of this aid was prompted
by the promise of U.S. tax relief.
Undoubtedly, some taxpayers did choose to donate more
to charity in the latter half of 2005 because of the promise of
tax relief. The tax relief accruing to Vice President Cheney for
his family’s $6.8 million in charitable donations for tax year
2005 even drew media attention (with commentators noting
that the relief did not go to disaster victims).294 The Cheneys
should not be faulted for their generosity; rather, the example
should illustrate the underlying problems with the tax relief
itself.
This tax policy violates vertical equity, because only
those with donations above the suspended limits would benefit.
Those likely to benefit the most would have to have sufficient
wealth to be able to subsist on less than fifty percent of their
AGI.295 Perhaps when you make millions or billions of dollars
in income you can afford to give much of it away.296 However,
290
See GAO-06-297T, supra note 197 ($2.5 billion contributed to charities in a
little over three months); see also Press Release, Giving USA Found., Charitable Giving
Rises 6 Percent to More Than $260 Billion in 2005: Disaster Relief Tops All Records
and Totals 3 Percent of All Giving (June 19, 2006), http://www.aafrc.org/press_releases/
trustreleases/0606_PR.pdf.
291
Stephanie Strom, Many Dismissing ‘Donor Fatigue’ as Myth, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2006, at A22 (“Fund-raising experts said it was unlikely that the tax break
accounted for [gains in donations] because many charities did not know about it in time
to capitalize on it.”).
292
See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 9 (citing Elizabeth Williamson, Charitable
Giving: A Generous Response Tends to Slow, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A25).
293
GAO-06-460, supra note 200.
294
See Christopher Lee, Bushes Paid $187,768 in Federal Income Tax; First
Couple’s Earnings Totaled About $735,000; Cheneys Made $8.8 Million, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2006, at A9; Marc D. Hoffman, Vice President and Mrs. Cheney Too Generous?
PLANNED GIVING DESIGN CENTER, Apr. 21, 2006, http://www.pgdc.com/usa/
item/?itemID=346546. Note the Cheneys have made disaster relief donations in the
past. See, e.g., Stephanie Kriner, Lynne Cheney Donates Book Proceeds to Disaster
Relief Fund, AM. RED CROSS, Dec. 14, 2001, http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/
donations/011214cheney.html.
295
I.R.C. § 68 normally requires high-income itemizers to reduce deductions
by 3% of the amount by which their AGI exceeds $100,000 (as adjusted for inflation) or
by 80% of their itemized amount (whichever is less). I.R.C. § 170 normally caps
allowable donations at 50% of AGI for the taxable year (though donations in excess of
that amount may be carried forward for up to five years).
296
See Lee, supra note 294. Warren Buffett’s record-setting multibillion
dollar donations in 2006 would tend to confirm that the ultra-wealthy can afford huge
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most middle class or poor taxpayers simply could not afford to
be prompted by these measures.297 Additionally, because of the
way the Code is structured, only taxpayers who itemize could
benefit from the relief.298
Even if taxpayers were motivated to donate more
because of tax relief, the amount that went to aid the victims is
highly suspect. Studies show that taxpayers who donate more
than fifty percent of their AGI tend to designate churches,
educational institutions (such as colleges and universities), and
Money
private foundations as the principal recipients.299
donated to private organizations is often saved and not spent
immediately.300 Money donated to schools, other than those in
the disaster area, is unlikely to benefit the victims. Even
donations to religious organizations tend predominantly to
support religious services and infrastructure costs, versus aid
to the poor.301
Although the tax measures allowed flexibility in terms
of recipients, the fear of “donor fatigue,” the notion that
taxpayers may shortchange other charities by diverting relief
to the victims of the disasters, never materialized.302 According
to Giving USA, a foundation devoted to research and education
in philanthropy, while disaster relief topped all records in
2005, the average charitable giving per household in the
United States remained at 2.2% of disposable income, exactly
the same as the forty-year average.303 Furthermore, the
amount of charitable donations targeted toward disaster relief
was a meager three percent of all charitable donations.304
donations. See Editorial, Buffett Gives Up His Fortune: Largest Charitable Gift in
History Will Benefit Those Who Need Help Most, BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), June 28, 2006,
at A8.
297
See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 8-9.
298
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, temporarily
allowed a charitable deduction for taxpayers who did not itemize; this capability for
non-itemizers terminated in 1986. S. REP. NO. 107-211, at *4 n.3 (2002), 2002 WL
1590762. Unlike the proposed CARE Act of 2002, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (see S. REP. NO.
107-211, at *4-*6, 2002 WL 1590762), recent tax reform legislation does not authorize
charitable deductions for non-itemizers. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
299
GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 9.
300
Id.
301
“[A]bout 70% of spending of religious organizations goes for services (the
church building, the minister), and only about 6% goes to poor people.” Id. at 9 n.12
(citing Jeff E. Biddle, Religious Organizations, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR? 92, 92-133 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992)).
302
Strom, supra note 291.
303
Press Release, Giving USA Found., supra note 290, at 2.
304
Id. at 1.
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Ad Hoc Relief Is Inefficient and Inequitable
1. Not on Same Sheet of Music

A defining feature of an emergency is that time is of the
essence. For this reason, prior planning is essential. In the
absence of prior planning, people are often forced to react
without benefit of all available information. The stress of the
moment may cause them to react rashly, or may paralyze them
into inactivity. Confusion is almost certain to ensue, as there
may be little time for coordination and decision-making.
In addressing tax relief for families, Congressman
Rahm Emanuel and Senator Barack Obama proposed in a
September 14, 2005, letter to Treasury Secretary John W.
Snow that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Child Tax
Credit, and education incentives be immediately accelerated.305
They proposed to capture such relief in a Bill entitled the
“Hurricane Katrina Accelerated Tax Refund Act.”306 The letter
acknowledged a policy goal of allowing “Americans who have
lost so much [to] receive their refunds now rather than later.”307
The administration resisted this program, noting: “The
significant resources that the legislation would require might
outweigh the benefit of a short acceleration of the refunds.”308
Congressional good intentions met with an administrative
inability to quickly execute those intentions. It is precisely for
these reasons that the Code should be rewritten so that a wellplanned network of readily executable and predictable
consequences automatically ensues in the wake of a natural
disaster.
2. Post-Hurricane Tax Relief Was Inequitable
Horizontal equity requires treating similar taxpayers
similarly. All other things being equal, it simply would not be
fair to allow blue-eyed taxpayers to itemize while denying this
305
Letter from U.S. Rep. Rahm Emanuel and U.S. Sen. Barack Obama to
John W. Snow, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Sept. 14, 2005), available at 2005 WL
3370031.
306
Id. The bill was never proposed. For a discussion of proposed legislation,
see supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
307
Id. The letter erroneously asserted a precedent for “fast-tracking” refunds
based on the tragic events of September 11, 2001. See id.; Letter from Eric Solomon,
Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y (Tax Policy), to U.S. Rep. Rahm Emanuel (Nov. 2, 2005).
308
Letter from Eric Solomon, supra note 307.
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opportunity to brown-eyed taxpayers. In other words, there
must be some justification for treating individuals with
identical incomes in different manners. The greatest fault of
the 2005 tax-relief measures is their failure to ensure
horizontal equity. Based on the Code, as amended by the two
Acts, there are six different classes of 2005 disaster victims—
GO Zone residents (Katrina core disaster area); other Katrina
disaster area victims; Rita and Wilma GO Zone residents; other
Rita and Wilma disaster area victims; victims in other declared
disaster areas; and other victims not in a declared disaster
area.309 Creation of preferred classes of victims makes little
sense.
For example, it is nonsensical that mileage allowances
are higher for volunteers who engaged in Hurricane Katrina
relief efforts than those who responded to Hurricanes Rita or
Wilma, or to any other disaster for that matter. In each
scenario, people need help, and others are willing to volunteer
to provide it. All these noble volunteers should be equally
entitled to the same tax refunds or tax-free reimbursements.
Under the Code, the allowable mileage rate has been lower for
such volunteer costs than for business costs,310 and Congress is
the best arbiter of what the appropriate ratio should be as a
matter of public policy. However, once that decision is made,
the ratio should be a constant for all disaster response. Then,
as gas prices escalate and the business mileage rates rise,
commensurate relief would be afforded to all rescuers, relief
workers, and other volunteers.
All of the benefits unique to Hurricane Katrina should
be scrutinized based on considerations of horizontal equity.
The only measures that should withstand such scrutiny are
those for which Hurricane Katrina warrants disparate
treatment on other policy grounds.
In other words, a
justification needs to be articulated to warrant additional relief
to Hurricane Katrina victims.
Where there is no such
justification, and the measures are otherwise meritorious,
limiting such relief either to Hurricane Katrina victims or to
Hurricane Katrina, Rita, and Wilma victims makes these
309
See supra Parts III and IV for a detailed discussion of the different tax
treatment of victims following the hurricanes of 2005.
310
Compare I.R.C. § 170(i) (limiting charitable mileage to fourteen cents per
mile), with Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2) (allowing standard business mileage at rates
established by IRS). Since 1998, the standard business mileage rate has been at or
above 31 cents per mile. See Rev. Proc. 98-63, 1998-2 C.B. 818.
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measures under-inclusive of others who would benefit from the
same tax treatment.
As an analogy, if public transportation benefits those
without a car who live two miles from work, then it stands to
reason it also benefits those without a car who live three miles
from work. If the government decided it would be sound policy
to offer free transportation to those in need, limiting the relief
to those who live two miles from work would be underinclusive. The policy would be over-inclusive if it afforded
relief to those who did not require it, such as affording free
public transportation to those living two miles from work who
own cars.
It is less obvious, but equally the case, that the 2005 tax
relief has been over-inclusive. For example, to the extent that
time extensions were given to those who did not need it (those
in the core disaster areas that were not flooded or did not lose
records), relief was over-inclusive.
Perhaps allowing the
disaster areas to serve as surrogates for those impacted by the
disaster is warranted if it makes tax administration easier,
especially where Congress is trying to economically stimulate
renewed spending and investment in the local communities.
However, where tax measures afford significant financial relief,
our lawmakers need to be mindful of these additional costs.
C.

Excessive Relief Stimulates Undesirable Behavior

Those who choose to live in higher-risk areas should
bear those risks. Indeed, if there is no accountability for bad
choices, then those choices will continue to be made.
Ultimately, if the federal government absorbs or absolves
individuals of all costs of their risky behavior, the costs are
never internalized into the decision-making process.311
Some have argued that those who choose to live in
higher-risk areas should also bear a higher share of the
emergency response and recovery costs.312 They contend that
“tax benefit equity requires that the costs of local emergency
311
For an interesting analysis of how flood insurance and protective measures
may actually induce increased risk of catastrophic loss, see Raymond J. Burby,
Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About
Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI., Mar. 2006, at 171.
312
Robert E. Deyle & Mary Kay Falconer, Revenue Options for a Risk-Based
Assessment of Developed Property in Hurricane Hazard Zones, 18 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 299, 300-01 (2003).
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management services necessitated by development of land
exposed to hurricanes be allocated among property owners in
proportion to the demand they create for such services.”313
Difficulties arise, however, in allocating proportions of
emergency service costs to hurricanes and in estimating such
costs, because “most jurisdictions have had no more than one
hurricane within the past 10 or 20 years.”314
Ironically, federal aid through FEMA and emergency
relief through non-profit organizations such as the Red Cross
may have exacerbated difficulties for small businesses by
affording cash to people who would otherwise have been
working.315 This relief may have served as a disincentive to
laborers, whom local businesses could have put to productive
use.
VI.

ENHANCED PROCEDURAL RELIEF IS NEEDED

Relief should be geared to that which is predictable.
But what is predictable? Following a tragedy, taxpayers may
not have access to their personal papers, tax documents, or
other such items; people and businesses will be in a
disadvantaged economic position; lives will be torn apart; and
people may die. For most disasters, someone will want to
help.316 While the tax code cannot bring the dead back to life, it
can be used to help restore or improve the economic life of all
casualty victims. Essentially, both substantive and procedural
relief should be afforded to all taxpayers suffering a casualty
loss.
We could all use more time and money. Obviously,
there are costs of foregone revenue, to the extent the
government allows any monetary tax relief (whether in the
form of credits, deductions, or exclusions from income). To the
extent the IRS grants additional time, on the other hand, the
government is deferring, versus reducing, income. Due to the
time value of money, deferral carries with it some intrinsic
costs (a dollar repaid next year is not worth as much as one
313

Id. at 305.
Id. at 304.
315
Runyan, supra note 158, at 23 (writing that small business owners saw
FEMA handouts as disincentives for employees to return to work).
316
The I.R.C. treatment of gifts helps individuals get back on their feet by
excluding the value of the gift from income. I.R.C. § 102. Further, the Red Cross helps
many in need, even when no disaster has been declared. Allowing this relief to be free
from taxation aids the victims. See generally I.R.C. § 139.
314
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paid today);317 however, when it comes to disaster victims, these
costs are negligible compared to the public policy benefits.
The potential for so much good is justification enough to
at least explore whether certain tax measures might sensibly
be employed as tools to aid victims of disaster. To the extent
that tax-related proposals are equitable, simple, and
inexpensive to administer, they should be thoughtfully
considered now, before the next disaster strikes.
The IRS has been sensitive to hardships faced by
victims and has granted relief in the past.318 Indeed, the IRS
has itself been the victim of Mother Nature.319 When IRS
facilities were struck by Hurricane Rita, the Service granted
itself an extension for performing government actions
associated with processing disaster-related returns.320 The
principles here should be governed more by common sense and
fair dealing than by concerns about maximizing every penny of
tax revenue—the U.S. government ought not kick individuals
when they are down. Based upon principles of horizontal
equity, these changes should be extended to all casualty
victims.
Code Section 7508A, affording the IRS discretionary
authority to extend filing and payment deadlines, could easily
be modified to mandate such essential relief. KETRA, for
example, mandated that the IRS extend deadlines for the
Katrina disaster area “at least until February 28, 2006.”321 An
identical mandate was contained in the GO Zone Act for all
those within the declared disaster areas of the other

317
To combat the effects of deferral, ordinarily the IRS collects interest under
I.R.C. § 6404, even when penalties are waived based on hardship or just cause.
318
See supra Part II.D.
319
IRS headquarters at 1111 Constitution Avenue, was closed for at least a
month in 2006 and sustained millions of dollars in damage due to torrential rains in
the Washington, D.C., area. Megan Greenwell, IRS HQ Partly Closed Until January,
WASH. POST, July 11, 2006, 2006 WLNR 11951703.
320
I.R.S. Notice 2005-82, 2005-47 I.R.B. 978.

Documents maintained by the IRS within the covered disaster area may have
been lost or destroyed as a result of Hurricane Rita, or remain in buildings
that are inaccessible. The destruction, loss or inaccessibility of these
documents will materially interfere with the IRS’s ability to timely
administer the internal revenue laws with respect to certain taxpayers.
Id. at 978-79.
321
KETRA § 403(b). Katrina relief included automatic waivers of filing
deadlines and payment of taxes, automated abatement of any interest and penalties,
and time extensions for all actions identified in I.R.C. § 7508(a)(1). Id.
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hurricanes.322 Congress could just as easily grant six months of
relief to every taxpayer in a declared disaster area, or even to
every taxpayer claiming a casualty loss.
For victims of Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki, and
the hurricanes of 2004, the IRS granted generous global
extensions to taxpayers in the designated disaster areas or
those who alleged to have been affected by these disasters.323
Similar relief was afforded to victims of September 11, 2001.324
The IRS has also granted extensions due to earthquakes, fires,
blackouts, and floods.325 The amount of relief for these declared
disasters has varied from a few days or weeks to many
months.326
In 2006, the IRS automated the extension process for all
taxpayers (not just disaster victims).327 The new process grants
taxpayers a six month extension for filing, but taxpayers
remain liable for paying estimated taxes and face late payment
penalties and interest if they have not made an adequate
payment at the time taxes are originally due.328 In light of the
potential administrative burden of extending the deadlines for
all taxpayers (of whom those impacted by disasters are only a
small percentage), the only consequence to the government of
automated relief for disaster victims is the waiver of interest
and penalties.
Congress should take the next step to make relief from
interest and penalties mandatory, versus discretionary, for all
declared disaster areas. Such a change would lead to greater
tax equity among those impacted by presidentially-declared

322

I.R.C. § 1400S(c). The IRS later used its statutory discretion to extend
further the filing and payment deadlines until August 28, 2006, but for Hurricane
Katrina victims only. I.R.S. Notice 2006-20, 2006-10 I.R.B. 560-61 (redefining “covered
disaster area” to include only the GO Zone).
323
See supra Part II.D.
324
I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. 305, 305-06.
325
E.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-94-5 (Jan. 19, 1994) (Los Angeles earthquake);
I.R.S. Notice 94-87, 1994-2 C.B. 559, 559-60 (Southeast floods); I.R.S. News Release IR2003-100 (Aug. 15, 2003) (Northeast blackout); I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1 C.B. 989,
989-90 (Cerro Grande fire).
326
See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-100, supra note 325 (granting seven
days for the blackout); I.R.S. News Release IR-94-5, supra note 325 (granting ten days
for the earthquake); I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-118, supra note 148 (granting 108
days for Hurricane Ivan); I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1 C.B. 989, supra note 325
(granting nine months for the Cerro Grande fire).
327
I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-58 (Apr. 10, 2006).
328
Id. See also I.R.C. § 6081 (authorizing Secretary to extend filing deadline
up to six months); Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-4T(c) (requiring timely tax payment
notwithstanding filing extension).
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disasters by imposing predictable and uniform consequences,
instead of an ad hoc disaster-by-disaster approach by the IRS.
It should also be easier for the IRS to implement than a system
where each disaster must be individually considered.
Even where disasters have not been declared, Congress
should grant an automatic six month extension waiving
interest and penalties for every casualty loss. Penalty relief
has been available in the past to such casualty victims, but it
has not been guaranteed; rather, each case has been evaluated
on its merits, and the IRS has made individual determinations
Such a case-by-case
as to whether to grant relief.329
determination method is intrinsically time-consuming,
requiring taxpayer initiation of a request for relief, IRS
investigation and corroboration of the factual assertions, and
ultimately an IRS determination.330 Even where relief is
granted, it may take the bureaucracy months to come to this
determination.331 Interest has not been similarly relieved.332
A better approach would be to statutorily grant six
months of relief under Code Section 7508A to any victim based

329

I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL §
20.1.1.3.2.5 (Aug. 20, 1998), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/ch01s01.html. Bona fide
reasons for relief include taxpayers being unable to access their records or, as the
result of an accident, taxpayers being hospitalized and thus unable to file the return or
pay the tax. Id. Fire, casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbances are merely
factors to consider, not necessarily sufficient in and of themselves to justify penalty
relief. Id.
330
The Internal Revenue Manual provides:
(4) Penalty relief may be appropriate if the taxpayer exercised ordinary
business care and prudence, but due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s
control they were unable to comply with the law.
(5) Factors to consider include:
• Timing.
• Effect on the taxpayer’s business.
• Steps taken to attempt to comply.
• If the taxpayer complied when it became possible.
(6) The determination to grant relief from each penalty must be based on the
facts and circumstances surrounding each individual case.
Id.
331
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-47-021 (Nov. 25, 2005) (waiver based on
2004 hurricanes granted late 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-46-044 (Nov. 18, 2005)
(waiving sixty-day period for IRA rollover requested in April 2005, granted in August
2005).
332
Unless suspended under I.R.C. § 7508A, the Code presently allows
abatement of interest only where an assessment is excessive, or erroneously or illegally
assessed. I.R.C. § 6404.
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upon the taxpayer’s bona fide assertion of a casualty.333 While
such an extension might accrue to those whose records are
intact and do not need an extension, the incentive to file sooner
to obtain relief more quickly should be a sufficient motivator to
prompt them to file as soon as they are able to do so.
The IRS should be allowed the discretion to grant up to
an additional year based on circumstances.334 This presents a
more equitable approach (not favoring victims of one hurricane,
fire, or flood over another)335 and a more efficient and timely
process for the government.336 It also affords casualty victims
the assurance that they will not face penalties if they are
unable to meet original deadlines. The cost of standardization
and simplification would only be the time value of money for
those who owe from the time their taxes were originally due
until actually paid.337
Finally, proof problems in establishing casualty losses
with sufficient certainty would likely be reduced,338 as the six
month relief would allow victims time to obtain government
copies of their previous tax records and estimates for repairs
and replacement of damaged property.
This increased
information should eliminate some of the evidentiary problems
confronting taxpayers when records have been destroyed and

333
Assertions would be subject to later verification by audit if necessary.
Additionally, Congress could define a bona fide assertion to require the taxpayer to
have proof of an insured loss. Such a precaution could both foster insurance and shift
the burden of initial corroboration from the IRS to the private insurance industry.
334
The same procedures as employed at present–notice for declared disasters
and case-by-case determinations for other situations–could be used.
The key
advantage to the victim in the latter case is that the application for additional relief
could be processed during the six-month automatic extension.
335
On the heels of KETRA, Senator Chuck Grassley indicated, “We also want
to help protect Katrina victims from undeserved IRS problems.” Grassley, supra note
222, at 1. Such protection should equally extend to all disaster victims.
336
In all but the most extreme cases, taxpayers ought to be able to regenerate
sufficient records and documentation to substantiate their return within the six-month
period. In addition to relieving the IRS of initial case-by-case determinations
altogether, a taxpayer’s filing of actual returns at the end of the six-month period
means that both the IRS and the taxpayer will be in a better position to determine
actual tax liability than if the individual had to guess when submitting an estimated
return based upon incomplete information. For years, victims have been flagging their
returns (most recently in red ink) to notify the IRS of a disaster, see, e.g., supra Part
II.D.; the same procedure could easily apply. In essence, compassionate treatment of
victims trumps administrative convenience. This is the appropriate moral balance.
337
Where taxpayers are due a refund, the government does not lose anything.
338
See James A. Fellows, Tax Issues, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 484, 485-88 (2006)
(measuring and proving value of destroyed property for tax purposes is highly
problematic). Proof problems related to lost records and uncertainty in valuation
would be eliminated if a credit was used instead of a deduction. See infra Part VII.
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also allow both the taxpayer and the IRS to make more wellinformed decisions.339
If the government is concerned about potential fraud,
simple protective measures could be implemented.
For
example, a taxpayer could be required to attach verification of
receipt of insurance proceeds to create a presumption that he
or she has suffered a qualifying casualty loss.340 Such a
measure would allow the IRS to rely on the insurance industry
to screen out spurious claims and would serve the dual purpose
of motivating taxpayers to secure flood or other casualty
insurance.
VII.

CASUALTY LOSS CREDIT WOULD BETTER AID THE POOR

Modern methods of advance preparation, early warning,
and evacuation in response to projected landfall of major
hurricanes have helped to save lives, but although you can
move people to safety, the same is not true of their homes and
property.341
Direct federal aid is one way to provide relief to victims
of major disasters. Disaster relief programs, benefiting both
individuals and businesses, are administered by FEMA and the
One potential
Small Business Administration (SBA).342
drawback of direct aid from the federal government is the
339
Fellows, supra note 338, at 495-98 (citing recent tax court decisions
denying casualty losses even while acknowledging records may have been destroyed in
the underlying disasters). Note that the proof of loss by “closed and completed
transactions” required by Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) may also vitiate the utility of the
I.R.C. § 165(i) election to take casualty losses in the previous year (for some victims),
because taxpayers must already know which losses will be reimbursed and the extent
of such reimbursement.
340
The IRS created several “safe harbor” methods that individuals could use
after Katrina, Rita, and Wilma to overcome proof problems; one method deemed
reports prepared by the individual’s homeowner’s or flood insurance company
acceptable to show estimated loss. Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61, 62, 65.
341
As this article was being written, a tornado ravaged Troy, Illinois,
shattering forty-to-eighty-foot trees and sending trunks, limbs, and branches into
nearby houses. Although the author’s mother-in-law is among the victims, she will not
be entitled to the waiver of the $100 or 10% AGI limits because the damage did not
arise from Hurricanes Wilma, Rita, or Katrina. Even if eligible, she would not benefit
because she does not itemize.
342
Surprisingly, “the majority of SBA disaster assistance is directed to
homeowners, to help rebuild their homes.” Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Small Bus.:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 109th Cong. 1 (2005)
(testimony of Hector V. Barreto, Admin., U.S. Small Bus. Admin.), [hereinafter Barreto
statement]. As of September 22, 2005, the SBA had “distributed approximately
850,000 applications for loans to individuals and businesses.” Id. at 3 (statement of
Sen. Olympia J. Snowe, Chair, S. Comm. on Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship).
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bureaucracy that accompanies such aid.343 Often, those who
stand to benefit are not familiar with the programs available,
and there are lengthy delays or cumbersome requirements
associated with qualifying for the relief.344 Another drawback is
that federal relief is only triggered in major emergencies
(where state and local assistance are inadequate) and does not
extend to the victims of arson, an isolated lightning strike, or
other more particularized casualty.345
While a detailed analysis of the potential difficulties
involved in direct relief346 is beyond the scope of this article, it is
worth noting that avenues outside the tax code are available,
and arguably more effective, than traditional tax measures.347
343
Past relief efforts have at times been criticized for delays and denials; relief
has been slow or has been imperfect. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 4, at 59
(“[V]ictims confronted an enormously bureaucratic, inefficient and frustrating process
that failed to effectively meet their needs.”); GAO-06-712, supra note 199, at 18 (“To
help ensure that FEMA’s resource tracking system will meet the needs of those
requesting FEMA assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of [Homeland Security]
direct FEMA to ensure that it obtains input from the Red Cross as it develops a
resource tracking system.”).
344
See GAO-06-442T, supra note 38, at 1-2, 40 (describing the public’s
widespread dissatisfaction with SBA and its backlog of about 100,000 hurricanerelated loan applications that created delays of approximately ninety-four days).
345
Because state and federal relief does not reach all victims, emergency relief
organizations, such as the American Red Cross, are likely to deliver more aid, more
quickly, and with less red tape. The National Response Plan now names the American
Red Cross as the lead agency for coordinating federal mass care assistance to support
local efforts to respond to natural disasters. See GAO-06-712, supra note 199, at 10.
346
One problem that arises is ensuring direct assistance is distributed
properly. FEMA provided over $5.9 billion in direct assistance, “the most ever provided
by FEMA to victims of any single natural disaster,” and more than twice the amount of
Individuals and Households Assistance Program (IHP) dollars for the 1994 Northridge
earthquake and Hurricane Andrew combined. Fact Sheet, The White House Office of
Commc’ns, A Commitment to Continued Recovery and Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast
(Dec. 21, 2005), available at 2005 WL 348053. Unfortunately, FEMA reportedly
provided aid to 16% of individuals who did not really need it. GAO, HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF: IMPROPER AND POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT
INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN $600 MILLION AND $1.4
BILLION 4, GAO-06-844T (2006).
FEMA used limited procedures to review
registrations for disaster relief—such as allowing individuals to apply for assistance
via telephone or Internet—which “left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse.”
GAO-06-655, supra note 3, at 2. “Victims” apparently duped FEMA into grants for
vacations and jewelry, among other things. FEMA Hurricane Cards Bought Jewelry,
Erotica, CNN.COM, June 14, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/06/14/fema.audit.
1908/index.html.
347
Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705, 721 (1970) (“[M]ost tax incentives have decidedly adverse effects on
equity . . . . [They] are highly irrational”). See also Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the
Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 735
(2002) (arguing that Congress should refrain from inappropriate tax changes to solve
every social problem); John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55
ARK. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2002) (noting that increased reliance on the Code for assistance
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Additional relief in the form of tax breaks, however, would help
both individuals and businesses get back on their feet.348
(Although tax incentives to stimulate business recovery and tax
incentives for families to recover are equally important,349 they
are sufficiently different to warrant independent discussion of
business measures in Part X.)
According to the Congressional Research Service, “[i]n
many ways, the tax system is not well suited to helping victims
in disaster areas . . . .”350 However, tax relief to those who are
likely to spend most of it—low and moderate income
individuals—can effectively provide relief and stimulate the
affected economy.351 Furthermore, as distinguished from pure
welfare, income tax relief and incentives help those who are
earning income.
As a public policy matter, if the principal justification
for intervention is the desire to help people who have faced a
significant loss to reclaim their lives, the government is
implicitly insuring the victims against loss by spreading the
costs of the disaster among taxpayers as a whole.352 This
“distributional” intervention spreads the risk of disaster
nationwide.353 Congress must strike the right balance. Relief
as a safety net prevents people from becoming homeless or
otherwise burdensome to society; however, too much relief fails
to adequately penalize overly risky behavior.
The current tax code strikes the wrong balance. It fails
to provide an adequate safety net for the poor.354 While tax
relief aids some victims, the casualty loss benefits are most
likely to help higher income individuals.355 Code Section 165
may distort tax equities). But see Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and
Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 188 (2004) (stating that tax expenditure analysis
should be grounded in a fuller appreciation of fiscal issues generally).
348
For a comprehensive discussion of the SBA benefits available to businesses
and individuals, see Lipman, supra note 8, at 965-67 (discussing, among other relief,
low-interest disaster loans of up to $200,000 for home repair).
349
Letter from Rahm Emanuel, supra note 305.
350
GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 5.
351
Id. at 3 (current spending is substantially related to current income).
352
Id. at 12.
353
Id.
354
There are several impediments to deducting casualty losses under I.R.C. §
165, most significantly the need to itemize to benefit at all, the ten percent AGI
threshold, and the $100 reduction. See I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)-(2).
355
Only 46 million of over 132 million filers itemized for tax year 2004. I.R.S.,
SOI Tax Stats—Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report),
tbl.
1.2
(Tax
Year
2004),
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/
0,,id=134951,00.html [hereinafter IRS, SOI Tax Stats] (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (click
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requires a taxpayer to itemize in order to take the casualty loss
deduction. Since the majority of Americans do not itemize,356
most are not helped by this section.357
Even for those individuals who itemize, the deduction is
whittled away. Section 165(h) reduces the deduction by $100
for each casualty and also limits the loss to amounts exceeding
ten percent of adjusted gross income (AGI). The net result is
that the average taxpayer receives less than $40 of tax relief as
a result of this deduction.358
As noted in Parts III and IV, the Katrina Emergency
Tax Relief Act and the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 do
away with these reductions for the victims of Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma only.359 This relief is generous for the designated
victims, but not generous enough for the tens of thousands of
other casualty victims of 2005 (not to mention taxpaying
generations preceding or to follow). Furthermore, this relief is
the most costly component of KETRA and was projected to
exceed $2.4 billion in lost tax revenue.360
To illustrate the inequities, if a single taxpayer
(Taxpayer A) outside the GO Zone earned $50,000 AGI and
suffered $10,000 of unreimbursed casualty loss, the most she
could deduct would be $4,900.361 If an identical taxpayer was in
the GO Zone, on the other hand, she could deduct the entire
$10,000.362

on table 1.2, tax year 2004 under Basic Tables: Returns Filed and Sources of Income).
Fewer than one in three taxpayers with an AGI below $40,000 itemize, with far lower
percentages at lower income levels. Id.
356
Id.; see also Kurtz, supra note 288, at 165-66 (blaming much of the
complexity of the tax code on itemized deductions).
357
The value of an itemized deduction is not fully realized unless a taxpayer
already has sufficient deductions to exceed the standard deduction. Perhaps this
partially explains why less than one in one thousand taxpayers on average have
claimed a casualty loss over the past several years. See IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note
355, at tbls. 1.2, 2.1 (tax years 1993-2003). For example, just 89,781 of 130,423,626
returns claimed a casualty or theft loss in 2003. Id.
358
See id.
359
See I.R.C. § 1400S(b); Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61, 62-63
(applying safe harbor provisions to victims of Katrina, Rita, and Wilma).
360
JCX-65-05, supra note 160.
361
Ten percent of $50,000 AGI is $5,000, which is subtracted from the $10,000
loss after the $100 is subtracted. However, if her total itemized deductions did not
exceed $5,000, she would be better off taking her $5,000 standard deduction and thus
not derive any benefit from the tax break. The standard deduction is governed by
I.R.C. § 63(c). See also Cost-of-living Adjustments for 2005, Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 200450 I.R.B. 970; I.R.S., 2005 1040 Instructions, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040-2005.pdf.
362
See I.R.C. §§ 165(h), 1400S(b).
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A similar taxpayer in the GO Zone earning $200,000
(Taxpayer B) could deduct the full $10,000 of unreimbursed
loss, although this same higher income taxpayer would be
entitled to no deduction at all if she lived outside of the 2005
designated hurricane relief areas (the ten percent AGI
reduction would eliminate the Section 165 deduction).363
The ten percent AGI reduction helps maintain a
progressive tax code (higher income taxpayers must absorb
more of their loss) and serves as an incentive to insure (by
penalizing any loss whatsoever), but at the same time, it
seriously erodes the amount of tax relief. In the above
example, Taxpayer B (in the GO Zone) gets more than twice as
much relief as Taxpayer A (outside the GO Zone) even though
they sustain the same losses and Taxpayer A earns only onefourth as much income.
Another fault of the 2005 relief is that it affords more
relief to those with higher amounts of uninsured losses. For
example, if Taxpayer B was fully insured with a $500
deductible, her GO Zone tax deduction would be limited to
$500; if uninsured, her deduction would be $10,000.364 The tax
laws should not reward such risky behavior.
Furthermore, there is an overwhelmingly regressive
aspect to Section 165, both as codified and as modified by the
2005 legislation, since the actual dollars of tax relief are driven
by the taxpayers’ marginal tax rates. Thus, a higher-income
taxpayer will realize twenty-five cents or more on the dollar
she is able to deduct, compared to, at most, ten or fifteen cents
on the dollar for lower-income taxpayers.365
A refundable tax credit of up to $1,000 per victim
($2,000 per family for married filing jointly) would be more
equitable. Using the illustration above, Taxpayer A in the ten
percent bracket would receive $1,000, as opposed to (at most)
$490. Taxpayer B in the twenty-five percent bracket would
receive $1,000, versus $2,500366 under the present scheme.
Thus, Taxpayer B would have an incentive to carry more
363
GO Zone deductions are subject to limitations on overall itemized
deductions. See I.R.C. § 68; see also I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)-(2) (outside the GO Zones, to be
allowed any deduction, a $200,000 taxpayer would ordinarily need casualty losses in
excess of $20,100).
364
Since there are no casualty loss reductions under KETRA, a taxpayer who
itemizes may deduct their entire loss—ironically the loss of those who fully insure is
only their deductible amount. See KETRA § 402.
365
See generally I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d), (i).
366
Subject to limitations on overall itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 68.
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insurance. As this simple example illustrates, low income
taxpayers would be much better off, and higher income
taxpayers would not be favored, if a tax credit replaced the
Section 165 deduction.
What should a casualty loss tax credit look like?
Certainly a nominal flat rate of $1,000 per single victim and
$2,000 per family would be equitable, but this is not the only
logical formula.367 Any credit could be phased out at higher
incomes to maintain the progressive structure of the tax code
and reduce foregone revenue. Or, to motivate people to carry
sufficient insurance, the credit could be either linked to or
predicated upon an individual’s insurance deductible. A flat
rate enjoys the advantage of simplicity.
Because maximizing aid is most important for those
with the lowest incomes, any credit for casualty loss should be
fully refundable.368 Only measures focused on refundable
credits—those where the government will pay even after tax
liability has been reduced to zero—will benefit the most
impoverished workers.369
The guaranteed $10,000 minimum tax relief to the
victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks establishes a
precedent for relief in excess of tax obligation out of sympathy
for victims.370 Crafting the same full refundability for casualty
losses would be optimally suited to those who are least likely to
be able to afford complete insurance coverage and who are least
likely to have any savings to fall back on in an emergency.371 A

367
There is no magic in the amount proposed, but over a million families
(twice as many single taxpayers) could be helped with such a credit at a cost to the
government of less foregone revenue than the $2.4 billion that the casualty loss
deduction is expected to cost just for Katrina. See JCX-65-05, supra note 160.
368
Additional deductions do not help workers in the lowest income groups
(who really pay no income taxes), because their other deductions and exemptions
already reduce to zero their tax liability. See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 2.
369
In the present tax code, the Earned Income Tax Credit, I.R.C. § 32, and the
Child Tax Credit, I.R.C. § 24, are examples of refundable credits for qualifying
taxpayers.
370
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115
Stat. 2427 (2002) (codified at I.R.C. § 692).
371
One study found that about one-third of the advance tax rebate mailed to
taxpayers in 2001 was spent in the first three months, and another third in the
following three months. GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 3 (citing David G. Johnson et al.,
Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001, at 20 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10784, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10784). This study also found that spending was greater for households with
low levels of wealth, consistent with other evidence that lower income individuals have
a higher propensity to spend. Id.
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credit provides an outstanding procedural benefit as well—
eliminating proof problems caused by a lack of records.
A fully refundable, retroactive disaster credit would be
even better. Even with a tax credit, the difficulty in making
tax relief meaningful remains timeliness—getting the money
quickly into the hands of those who need it.372 Congress
implicitly recognized this crucial timing issue in I.R.C. Section
165(i). Regrettably, this option to elect to treat casualty loss
deductions in the preceding year is only available to those who
suffer losses “attributable to a disaster occurring in an area
subsequently determined by the President [to warrant federal
relief].”373 Victims in these areas have a tax advantage.374
In a sense, the tax code creates “tax-preferred” victims
when a presidential disaster area has been declared375 and
allows “super tax-preferred” victims of the 2005 hurricanes.376
However, all victims of casualty losses should equally benefit
from the same compassionate tax treatment.
Although the IRS might complain that it is more
onerous to allow relief to be retroactive, the need to treat
similarly situated taxpayers fairly should outweigh these
incidental costs.377 The same policy rationale—allowing relief of
taxpayer hardship to outweigh increased complexity and
administrative burden—applies whether a disaster has been
presidentially-declared or not.378 A simple change to the tax
code could allow all victims of casualty losses equal tax
treatment.

372

GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 2.
I.R.C. § 165(i)(1).
374
However, those in the lowest tax brackets may likely have had no tax
obligation in the preceding taxable year to reduce. The Section 165(i) election is
useless to these taxpayers.
375
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 139, 165(i).
376
See supra Parts III and IV for a detailed discussion of the different tax
treatment of victims following the hurricanes of 2005.
377
For 2003, fewer than one in one thousand taxpayers used the casualty loss
deduction. See IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 355, at tbls. 1.2 and 2.1 (tax year 2003).
Looking back at all available statistics on the IRS web site, 225,085 was the largest
number of filers claiming casualty losses in any tax year (1994). Id. at tbl. 2.1
(providing data for tax years 1993-2003). Even if these numbers tripled by extending
relief to non-itemizers, they would amount to fewer than one percent of all returns.
Changing the deduction to a credit, which eliminates the need for the IRS to verify
actual losses, should more than offset administrative difficulties in issuing out-of-cycle
relief for these victims.
378
The victim could simply write the name of the declared disaster area (or
“casualty” where no disaster has been declared) in red on the top of their return or
amended return.
373
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EXPAND RETIREMENT ACCOUNT ACCESS TO ALL VICTIMS

Just as Social Security serves as a disincentive to saving
for retirement, it also provides a vital safety net to those who
otherwise could not afford to survive on their own. Similarly,
tax relief for casualty victims should only be a safety net, not a
substitute for prudent investment and insurance.
Tax incentives for retirement savings, whether
employer-provided or Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
have motivated people to save for their retirement needs.379
The government has agreed to defer or forgo tax revenues to
foster this desirable public behavior. These measures have
helped millions of Americans better posture themselves for
retirement.380 In addition to helping people help themselves,
the aid helps to reduce the rolls of those who would otherwise
be completely dependent on others (or the government) for
survival.
Over the years, Congress has devised a well-balanced
menu of options to further this public policy goal. At the heart
of all plans, however, is the notion of an individual setting
aside some of their present income in exchange for tax-free
accumulation and later access to the funds. Both this part and
the next part below examine beneficial tax policies based upon
the same principal. If tax-deferred accumulation of wealth can
be tapped without adverse tax consequences, victims will be
better postured to provide for themselves in an emergency.
The relief in KETRA and the GO Zone Act strikes the
right balance in allowing these individuals to help themselves:
victims may withdraw, without penalty, up to $100,000 from
an eligible retirement plan (with an option to reinvest within
three years as a rollover) and may prorate income over three
years; or taxpayers may instead borrow up to $100,000 from a
retirement savings plan at work and repay within five years.381
There is no harm in allowing people to have access to
their savings or to borrow from themselves in an emergency.382
To the extent they repay or qualify for a rollover, there is no
lost tax revenue compared to having their IRA money locked up
379
Victoria L. Bryant & Peter J. Sailer, I.R.S., Accumulation and Distribution
of Individual Retirement Arrangements, 2001-2002, SOI Bulletin, Spring 2006, at 233,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02iraart.pdf.
380
Approximately fifty million taxpayers hold $2.5 trillion in IRAs. Id. at 236.
381
I.R.C. § 1400Q.
382
In a sense they are borrowing from their “future selves;” failure to repay
could hurt them in the future.
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until retirement. For those who do not repay or rollover, there
is actually greater tax revenue now, as the income is realized in
the three years from time of distribution, versus in the future
at retirement age. Finally, fewer restrictions on access to IRAs
may encourage more people to use these savings vehicles.
As a matter of horizontal equity, anyone who loses their
home should have access to their IRA money without penalty,
not just the victims of Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. As a practical
matter, many taxpayers facing daunting casualty losses may
have nowhere else to turn for immediate cash. The Senate
agreed that all victims in presidentially-declared disaster areas
should enjoy such relief383 (the later compromise with the House
resulted in KETRA relief being narrowed to Hurricane Katrina
victims).384 Enhanced access could categorically be granted to
all casualty victims (declared disaster or not).385
In terms of vertical equity, the benefit of these measures
obviously does not extend to those who have no individual or
employer retirement accounts, predominantly the very poor.386
In addition, the wealthy may have no need for such relief and
allowing enhanced retirement account access would be
tantamount to an interest-free loan. To combat these concerns,
it should be clarified that such access would be in addition to
the casualty loss credit proposed above. To prevent abuse,
taxpayers with incomes above a certain level (such as
$250,000) could be designated as ineligible for this relief.
Relaxed retirement account rules would create an
important mechanism for those who need cash now and can
afford to repay later. For those who take distributions and do
not repay, the immediate relief may come at the expense of
their future well-being. However, those desperate enough to
compromise their post-retirement security should not face
additional tax penalties, compounding their financial injury.

383

See S. 1696, 109th Cong., §101 (2005).
KETRA § 101.
385
The pool of eligible beneficiaries could be extended to anyone suffering a
casualty loss; vertical equity measures, to prevent a windfall to the wealthy, would be a
question of implementing sufficient limitations within the Code itself (such as income
limitations for eligibility). These considerations should not prevent Congress from
harmonizing relief for future casualty victims with that offered to the victims in the
present GO Zones.
386
Only one in five taxpayers with income below $20,000 have an IRA or
retirement plan, compared to over half of all taxpayers with incomes over $100,000
(who have an IRA, retirement plan, or both). See Bryant & Sailer, supra note 380, at
242.
384
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CREATE CATASTROPHE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

An old adage calls for saving for a rainy day. Perhaps it
is time people actually do so. Unlike IRAs and retirement
savings plans, there is no tax incentive to save for a potential
catastrophe. Given the pathetic savings rate in the United
States,387 Congress should motivate people to set aside funds to
help insulate them from the financial consequences of a
disaster. These catastrophe savings accounts should be crafted
to be more suited to relief for disaster victims than enhanced
retirement account access, because they can emphasize and
complement insurance as a prerequisite to relief.
For example, the size of these accounts could be capped
to correspond to deductibles incurred during a disaster. As the
amount of the insurance deductible escalates, so too (to a limit)
would the potential for relief. Note that a higher deductible
allows for lower premiums for the taxpayer. Because the tax
relief only pertains when there has been an actual loss, the
savings from the reduced premiums can be invested over time.
In this manner, the taxpayer is able to cover her out-of-pocket
costs while insurance covers the remaining costs. There is
limited potential for abuse, because the money will be needed
to cover the deductible.
Two bills were introduced to advance tax relief designed
to enhance insurance coverage and make it more affordable.388
House Bill 4836, introduced by Florida Congressman Tom
Feeny, allowed deposits into non-taxable “Catastrophe Savings
Accounts.”389 Under this proposal, funds of up to $2,000 may be
deposited for individuals with insurance deductibles less than
$1,000.390 For those with larger deductibles, up to twice the
amount of their deductible, or $15,000 (whichever is less) may
be deposited.391

387
Nathan Dugan, Time to Rebalance Your Financial Habits?,
INDYCHANNEL.COM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.theindychannel.com/money/9638390/
detail.html (savings rate in 2005 entered negative territory for first time since 1933).
388
Policyholder Disaster Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2668, 109th Cong.
(2006) (providing for tax-free accumulation of insurers’ catastrophic reserves); H.R.
4836, 109th Cong. (2006) (providing for individual tax-free Catastrophe Savings
Accounts, analogous to Health Savings Accounts, to offset consumer deductibles and copays).
389
H.R. 4836, 109th Cong. (2006). Florida created the notion of such accounts
following the 2004 hurricanes. See supra notes 151-54.
390
H.R. 4836, § 2 (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 530A(c)(1)).
391
Id. (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 530A(c)(2)).
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Because the allowable deposits are not annual
maximums, but rather are based upon insurance deductibles,
the ability to contribute changes based upon insurance
coverage. Individuals who experience growth in the account up
to their existing limits would have to increase the amount of
their insurance deductible or face a taxable forced distribution.
Presumably, many would increase their deductible to avoid the
taxable event. These same individuals would benefit from
lower premiums when their deductible amounts increase.
Ultimately, the provisions induce taxpayers to bear more of
their own risk. At the same time, the accounts ensure a
reserve to meet the emergency costs.
Essentially, such tax-deferred accounts both encourage
insurance and motivate individuals to save for a rainy day.
However, under the proposed legislation, tax-free access to the
funds would be limited to presidentially-declared national
The same accounts could equally benefit
emergencies.392
victims of all casualty losses. Because of the interconnected
nature of the benefit and the insurance requirement, proof of
an insured loss, as opposed to a presidential declaration, would
be a more equitable trigger for tax-free withdrawal.
In addition to such accounts for individuals, businesses
should be allowed to set up accounts allowing tax deferred
growth (up to predefined limits based upon their deductibles)
and tax exempt access following a casualty loss. By fostering
insurance with a savings component to augment the insurance
proceeds, businesses would have ready access to needed cash
for rebuilding after a disaster. Such mechanisms should
reduce the need for other federal post-disaster relief.
House Bill 2668 proposed tax-free investment growth
for U.S. insurance companies of dedicated catastrophe
reserves.393 Many other countries already allow tax-preferred
accumulation in advance of the occurrence of a crisis.394
Basically, those in the insurance industry would be permitted
“controlled accumulation of pretax dollars in separate reserve
funds devoted solely to the payment of claims arising from
future major natural disasters.”395 Changes to I.R.C. § 832(c)
would allow such amounts to be deducted from insurance
392

Id. (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 530A(e)). If not used, funds may also
be withdrawn tax free at age sixty-two. Id.
393
H.R. 2668.
394
Hartwig, supra note 26, at 208.
395
H.R. 2668 § 2.
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company income.396 Like the catastrophe savings accounts for
individuals and businesses, allowing the private sector to
increasingly absorb the cost of major catastrophes takes some
of the burden of the recovery costs off of the federal
government.397
Other bills proposed state catastrophe insurance pools
with federal reinsurance.398 These proposals do not contain any
per se tax implications; however, the state-subsidized
insurance programs have been criticized by the insurance
industry because taxpayers in that state end up buying down
the premiums for those engaged in the most risky behavior.399
Although protection should be fostered for vulnerable
homeowners and businesses, they should pay premiums
proportionate to the risk.400
X.

IMPROVE TAX RELIEF FOR SMALL BUSINESSES

To be most beneficial, tax policy should foster recovery,
rebuilding, and re-employment in the wake of a disaster. Tax
provisions that already exist can aid victims somewhat, but the
relief may be largely ineffective due to the typical delay
between time of loss and the receipt of refunds after filing to
claim an incentive, credit, or deduction.401
KETRA and the GO Zone Act created incentives to aid
businesses in recovering and rebuilding.402 Many of these
incentives could be employed whether the need is peculiar to
396

Id. § 3(a).
Andreas Milidonis & Martin F. Grace, Tax-Deductible Pre-Event
Catastrophe Loss Reserves: The Case of Florida 40-41 (Ga. St. U. Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. &
Ins. Working Paper No. 06-1, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=893154 (concluding that based on actuarial assumptions
(which could vary), “the government may save significantly on disaster assistance”).
398
Natural Catastrophe Insurance Act of 2005, H.R. 4507, 109th Cong.
(covering both residential and real property business losses insured or reinsured by an
eligible state program); Homeowners’ Insurance Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4366,
109th Cong. (covering residential damage from any catastrophes (other than flood)
insured under a state program); Homeowners’ Insurance Availability Act of 2005, H.R.
846, 109th Cong. (covering residential property losses from hurricanes, earthquakes,
and their aftermath).
399
Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25.
400
The state or federal government could subsidize or insure those living in
low-income housing, but should also ensure that such housing is not located in flood
zones or hurricane-prone areas.
401
This principle is recognized implicitly and redressed somewhat in the
ability to elect casualty losses in the preceding tax year for certain disasters. I.R.C.
§ 165(i)(1).
402
See, e.g., KETRA §§ 201-02; GO Zone Act § 102, I.R.C. § 1400R.
397
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the victim (for example, isolated fire) or broad in scope (for
example, town flooded, earthquake, etc.). Others are more
suited only to large-scale disaster areas. The first section
below addresses tax measures that could be codified to aid all
disaster victims. The later sections analyze how automation of
special tax opportunities for major national disasters can
equitably target future tax relief.
A.

The Special Need to Protect Small Business
Our economy has created almost 5 million jobs since August 2003.
Small businesses create most new jobs in our country, and small
businesses have been a driving force behind America’s tremendous
economic growth and job creation. By adopting sound economic
policies that help small businesses continue to grow and expand, we
will keep our economy moving forward and create more jobs for
American workers.
—President George W. Bush403

Small businesses are more vulnerable to catastrophes
than large businesses—they generally have much lower cash
flow and fewer cash reserves than their larger counterparts.404
When small companies or family-owned businesses experience
a loss, the loss is much more likely to be a devastating or
terminal blow.405 Small businesses simply lack the financial
wherewithal to weather the storm.
A study of small businesses affected by Katrina revealed
that few businesses had adequately prepared for a tragedy of
such magnitude.406 For some, their emergency plans included
backing up data and bringing it home.407 These folks did more
than most; tragically, most resorted to methods that had
allowed them to survive milder previous hurricanes.408 A sense
of complacency and the notion that another hurricane was “no

403
Proclamation No. 7990, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,231 (Mar. 23, 2006) (President
George W. Bush, Proclamation Supporting Small Business Week).
404
Runyan, supra note 158, at 19.
405
According to the Institute for Business and Home Safety, following a major
disaster, “[a]n estimated 25 percent of businesses do not reopen.” SBA, Disaster
Preparedness, http://www.sba.gov/npm2006/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
406
Runyan, supra note 158, at 15.
407
Id. at 17. The SBA recommends all vital business records be copied and
saved at an offsite location at least 50 miles away from the main business site. SBA,
FAQs (Disaster Preparedness), http://www.sba.gov/npm2006/faq.html (last visited Jan.
9, 2007).
408
Runyan, supra note 158, at 17 (boarding up windows and/or doors).
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big deal” got the better of many individuals and small
businesses.409
Another interesting dynamic of small businesses is that
their business future and their personal well-being are so
dramatically integrated.410 For many Katrina victims, this
meant dealing with health, welfare, and safety issues at home
before turning to the business impacts.411 Many of these people
lost their homes in addition to their businesses.412 As with
other hurricane victims, taxes were probably the last thing on
their minds. For these reasons, automated extensions of tax
deadlines are vital to small businesses.413
For tax assistance to be effective, it must be timely. If a
business is to be able to pay taxes at all in the future, it must
survive today. Retroactive tax relief is therefore critical to
these taxpayers if tax measures are to have any immediate
benefit. Making relief retroactive cures the time lag otherwise
inherent in tax cuts and allows access to refunds at the time
funds are most needed.414
Allowing a business to amend a previous return and
treat casualty losses as if they occurred in the preceding tax
year makes the tax subsidy more equivalent to direct aid.415
This relief is presently available only in declared disaster
areas.416 Horizontal equity requires, however, that similar
taxpayers be treated similarly. The opportunity to elect to
deduct casualty losses in the previous year (so relief can be
obtained sooner) should be extended to all businesses. In the
alternative, Congress should at least make this relief available
to all small businesses. A preference for small businesses is
justified because of their increased dependence on present
revenues to meet cash flow demands.

409

Id. Because businesses had been through severe storms in the past, “the
tendency was to downplay the ‘worst-case scenario’ that actually transpired.” Id.
410
Id. at 21.
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
See supra Part VI.
414
Although such relief compromises the matching principle (expenditures are
matched to income so that deductions correspond to the same tax year for which
income was realized), it makes sound practical sense in this application. See generally
NEWMAN, supra note 283, at 137-38.
415
A cash infusion benefits the taxpayer as well as the relevant community,
since such money is available to be spent sooner for necessary repairs, new equipment,
etc., thereby bolstering the local economy.
416
This is only allowed by I.R.C. § 165(i) for declared disasters.
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Along similar lines, a carryback of deductions for net
operating losses (NOLs) is also helpful.417 The GO Zone Act
authorized a five-year carryback.418 This is especially useful for
flexibility to use the loss immediately.419 For example, if a twoyear NOL was allowed, but the business had not realized a
profit in either of the two preceding years, it would get no
relief; whereas the five-year carryback may allow them to reach
back to a profitable period. Or, if the business had a huge loss
but a narrow profit margin in the past, the NOL could be
carried back to all five years simultaneously.
Allowing a standard five-year carryback for all victims
of all disasters would be more equitable than only affording
this relief in 2005. As with the above recommendation, based
upon their heightened vulnerability, all small businesses
should be allowed this relief. Congress gets more bang for its
foregone tax buck by extending five-year NOL carrybacks to
small businesses from all disasters, rather than all businesses
affected by a particular disaster.
Of course, any deductions carried back would be lost for
the current year. Therefore, this relief is essentially revenue
neutral—the government is only allowing business losses
(which it would allow anyway) to be taken earlier. Yet, such a
change would allow small businesses to pocket the tax savings
at a critical juncture. Given the turmoil of the disaster itself
and the need to rebuild, one would expect a very positive
benefit to those small businesses most seriously affected (the
ones that most need the money immediately to rebuild).
B.

Opportunity Zones

This section continues upon the notion of the tax system
as a springboard to recovery. While it is easy to envision that
relief should be equitably extended so that none fall through
the safety net, the recovery concept may also make sense when

417
The Code currently allows a two-year NOL carryback.
I.R.C.
§ 172(b)(1)(A)(i).
418
GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(k).
419
Many small businesses begin in a loss position and do not become
profitable until later.
The federal set-aside program for small disadvantaged
businesses recognizes a five to nine year timeframe until “graduation,” when the
business can exist in a profit position on its own. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (discussing
small business set-aside program generally); 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(15) (defining
graduation and time limits of program).
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trying to promote redevelopment in a target area especially
devastated by disaster.
Over a decade ago, the federal government created
programs which use tax benefits to revitalize economically
depressed areas. While the legislation creating “Empowerment
Zones” (EZs) and “Enterprise Communities” (ECs) contained a
combination of grants, tax benefits, loans, and loan
guarantees,420 the more recent “Renewal Community” (RC)
legislation421 relies most heavily on tax benefits.422
In 1994, when the programs commenced, the only tax
advantage to early ECs was the ability to receive up to $3
million in bond proceeds from tax-exempt state and local
bonds.423 EZs could receive several forms of tax relief, including
a twenty percent credit on the first $15,000 in wages paid to EZ
residents who work in the EZ.424 The Joint Committee on
Taxation estimated these programs would cost $2.5 billion in
lost tax revenues from 1994-1998.425
Renewal Communities were a byproduct of the
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000.426 As the name
implies, tax incentives serve as the impetus for community
rejuvenation. In addition to employment tax credits (fifteen
percent of the first $10,000), the RCs enjoyed increased
expensing under Section 179, as well as a choice of bonus or
accelerated depreciation.427 The Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated the newer programs would reduce tax revenues by
$14.8 billion over the ensuing fifteen years.428
Unfortunately, insufficient data exists to show whether
these tax incentives are having the desired effects.429
420
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 1330102, 107 Stat. 312, 543-57 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.; EZ
and EC qualifications and eligibility codified at I.R.C. §§ 1391-97).
421
Consolidated Appropriations—FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 101, 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-589 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
422
GAO, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: FEDERAL REVITALIZATION PROGRAMS
ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED, BUT DATA ON THE USE OF TAX BENEFITS ARE LIMITED 1,
GAO-04-306 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04306.pdf.
423
Id. at 18.
424
Id. at 3. Measures include tax credit for wages paid to employees who live
and work in the enterprise zone, increased expensing (current year deductions) for
depreciable property, tax-exempt bonds for facilities, and postponement of capital gains
on the sale of qualified EZ assets. Id. at 17-19.
425
Id. at 17.
426
See Consolidated Appropriations Act—FY 2001 § 101(a).
427
See I.R.C. §§ 1400H-1400J.
428
GAO-04-306, supra note 422, at 17.
429
Id. at 3, 6-7.
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Nevertheless, they serve as a useful basis of comparison with
the more recent Liberty Zone and GO Zone Legislation, and as
a practical starting point for analyzing the merits of using
targeted tax relief at all.
In the case of rebuilding areas devastated by terrorists
or hurricanes, “the question is whether the standard
arguments for enterprise zones can be applied to rebuilding
areas that are not (at least in their entirety) chronically
depressed, but have been destroyed . . . . It is not clear that
they can be.”430 This author posits that while casualty loss
relief to individual business victims should be universal, at the
same time, opportunity zone relief (particularly tax-exempt
bond advantages and tax relief from cancellation of
indebtedness) should be severely restricted to scenarios of the
utmost devastation.
No one can forget the haunting images and devastation
of “Ground Zero” following the 2001 terrorist attacks. If ever a
community needed a boost for economic recovery it was these
citizens.431 The Liberty Zone, discussed in Part II.D.4, picked
up on the notion of tax relief for community renewal. The tax
relief package included employment credits, bonus and
accelerated depreciation, increased expensing for money
reinvested in Liberty Zone businesses, and an extension of time
(to five years) to replace destroyed property with like kind
property in the Liberty Zone.432 The last advantage had already
been codified at four years for victims of other declared
disasters.433 The remaining advantages are discussed in more
detail below.
1. Employment Credits
Employee retention credits are desirable for motivating
businesses to retain their workforce in the wake of a disaster.
Unlike the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), employee
retention credits only accrue to businesses that had to shut
430

GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 11.
Indeed, even in 2007, Congress was discussing further extending Liberty
Zone incentives. Bonus Depreciation Extension Act of 2007, H.R. 827, 110th Cong.
(Feb. 5, 2007).
432
I.R.C. § 1400L. But cf. GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 1 (targeting tax
subsidies after 2001 terrorist attacks not effective to speed up rebuilding, but may be
desirable means of compensating victims).
433
I.R.C. § 1033(h). It is debatable whether there is any material difference
between four years and five years.
431
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down and reopen in the disaster area.434 For this reason, they
are more suitable than the WOTC to stimulate rebuilding
versus relocating.
However, these credits are expensive. As originally
envisioned, this type of relief was targeted at businesses with
fewer than two hundred employees.435 With a maximum credit
of $2,400 per eligible employee,436 the tax benefit could reach a
theoretical cap of $480,000 per business. When the GO Zone
Act was passed, the small business limitation was removed, so
large businesses could obtain even more relief.437 With the
employee limit lifted, the theoretical cap went out the window.
Lost too was the ability to funnel relief to those most in need—
the smallest businesses.
Employee retention credits are a good idea to promote
rebuilding. To make relief more widespread and equitable, the
credit should be extended on a scaled-down version to all small
business victims of declared disasters. A small business limit
helps make this measure more fiscally responsible. Capping
the credit at $1,000 per employee and limiting it to the first one
hundred employees438 would benefit those most in need while
cutting the potential cost of the program dramatically.
The declared disaster requirement serves a useful
screening purpose; it targets relief to disasters so large that
employees might be dislocated from the region. Each time
lightning strikes there is justification for casualty loss relief,
even if only one taxpayer is devastated. On the other hand,
where tax relief is being used for regional rejuvenation or
recovery, an additional threshold inquiry into the severity of
the need is sensible to justify the lost tax revenue.
Based upon past practice, the designation by the
President of a National Disaster Area has served as a useful
434
Under KETRA, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit could be taken by any
business (wherever located) that hired Katrina core area workers. KETRA § 201(b)(2).
435
Id. § 202(c). The Liberty Zone Credit was limited to businesses with fewer
than 200 employees. I.R.C. § 1400L(a)(2)(C)(ii). Although using the WOTC construct,
the Liberty Zone Credit limits relief to businesses and employees located in New York
City. Id. § 1400L(a)(2)(C)(i), (h).
436
KETRA § 202(a) (credit of 40% for each employee’s annual wages up to
$6,000); I.R.C. §§ 51, 1400L(a)(2)(D)(iv)(II), 1400R (same).
437
See GO Zone Act § 201 (repealing KETRA § 202), I.R.C. § 1400R.
438
There should be no magic to the KETRA and Liberty Zone limits of 200
employees. Federal size qualifications for small businesses usually vary based upon
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) standards for the relevant
industry. 13 C.F.R. §121.101(b) (2006). The State of New York uses a bright-line, 100
employee rule for state aid. N.Y. ECON. DEV. LAW § 131 (McKinney 2006).
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expedient to trigger certain tax relief.
For the Gulf
Opportunity Zones, further narrowing of relief to declared “GO
Zone” disaster areas, which FEMA had identified for individual
or public assistance, ensured that the benefits were even better
focused. Similarly, the proposed reemployment credit should
be maximally focused on the specific zones FEMA determines
are eligible for individual or public assistance, striking the best
balance between relief and fiscal responsibility.
2. Increased Expensing and Depreciation
Bonus depreciation, the ability to expense capital items,
(especially clean-up and remediation costs) in the present year,
and accelerated depreciation would help every business trying
to withstand a devastating blow. These measures do not allow
the business to avoid income taxes; instead, they relate to the
timing of when tax deductions occur. When businesses take
increased deductions up front, they necessarily lose the same
deductions down the road.439 Unlike the employee retention
credits, these benefits do not cost the public anything other
than the time value of money.
To the extent they are needed at all, bonus depreciation,
the ability to expense capital items (especially clean-up and
remediation costs) in the present year, and accelerated
depreciation should be reserved exclusively for small
businesses. Small businesses are afforded a plethora of
government benefits because of our societal recognition of both
their value and their fragility.440 At the same time, affording
such relief to large businesses is far more likely to be
unnecessary for their corporate survival.441
If Congress determines that these measures are
warranted (the costs are outweighed by the value of
439
For a detailed explanation and useful illustrative examples, see I.R.S.
Notice 2006-67, supra note 7.
440
For an excellent historical review of the evolution of small and
disadvantaged business programs, see Maj. Thomas Jefferson Hasty, III, Minority
Business Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration’s 8(a)
Program: Past, Present, and (is there a) Future?, 145 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994). For
observations of present trends, see Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Federal and New York
Contracting Preferences for Small, Minority and Women-Owned Businesses, 8
N.Y.S.B.A. GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 34 (2006).
441
Based on the availability of SBA loans to disaster victims, a powerful
argument can be made that low-interest loans should be used to motivate capital
investments as opposed to tax relief. See Barreto statement, supra note 342, at 2
(“Physical disaster loans provide qualified businesses of any size that have sustained
uninsured losses up to $1.5 million with funds to repair or replace business property.”).
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stimulating
a
post-disaster
economy),
then
equity
considerations should prevail so that such relief is automated
upon a presidential determination that a catastrophe was so
severe as to warrant classifying it as a national disaster area.
Extending the same advantages to all small business victims of
declared major disasters allows all devastated communities an
equal hand in rebuilding.
3. Automate Low-Income Housing Credit (LIHC)
Housing shortages are also predictable following major
catastrophes.
Virtually identical suspensions of LIHC
requirements have stemmed from recent catastrophic natural
Why not automate temporary suspension of
disasters.442
income limitations so displaced individuals can reside in vacant
low-income housing units? Such relief could be effective the
date the president declares the area a national disaster area.
An advantage of automated statutory relief is that the
government could address the issue of displaced persons
globally, as it did after Hurricane Katrina, versus issuing
proclamations individually in response to requests by affected
states.443
Congress could easily codify such relief for all future
declared disaster areas where FEMA has qualified individuals
for relief. Statutory relief would offer significant procedural
benefits by eliminating requirements for the affected states to
request relief and the IRS to process and approve such
requests. The provisions included in the typical IRS Notice—to
promote sheltering the victims of disasters, while protecting
the rights of current residents of low income housing—could
simply be included in the statute.444 The identical recordkeeping, rent restrictions, and protections for existing tenants
should be retained to ensure the relief is not abused.
Furthermore, the codified relief could mandate that the
benefits be subject to approval of the state housing agency (a
442
I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, supra note 150 (relief in Alabama due to Ivan), is
virtually identical to I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147 (relief in Florida due to
Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne), and I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150 (relief
in Ohio after Ivan). See also I.R.S. Notice 2005-69, 2005-40 I.R.B. 622 (Hurricane
Katrina LIHC relief); I.R.S. Notice 2006-11, 2006-7 I.R.B. 457 (following Hurricane
Rita).
443
See I.R.S. Notice 2005-69, supra note 442; I.R.S. Notice 2006-11, supra note
442.
444
See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; I.R.S. Notice 2004-74,
supra note 150; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150.
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provision found in previous IRS LIHC relief statutes).445 Such a
provision is all that is needed for a state housing authority to
refuse such relief when no housing shortage ensues from a
disaster; it would effectively allow states to veto unnecessary
relief. Similarly, the duration of the relief should be left to the
discretion of state housing authorities, subject to a statutory
one-year cap to ensure relief truly remains “temporary.”
XI.

TAX CREDITS TO PROMOTE MITIGATION

Another way to address the temporary housing issue is
to have fewer displaced individuals to begin with. More
resistant structures actually help both individuals as well as
businesses. Much of the damage from Hurricane Andrew
resulted from buildings being inadequately constructed.446 The
State of Florida and the insurance industry began a massive
In the
program to tighten building code compliance.447
aftermath of the hurricanes striking Florida in 2004, the
insurance industry noted that the most severely damaged
structures were those built before Hurricane Andrew.448
In trying to restore solvency to the National Flood
Insurance Program, Congress is looking for ways to better
mitigate future flood risks.449 Along similar lines, the SBA
proposed increasing the amount of lending assistance the SBA
could provide for hurricane mitigation measures, such as storm
shutters or construction of seawalls.450
Hardening structures to a wide variety of perils would
reduce federal exposure should Congress decide to expand
federal insurance programs to all major catastrophes. Even if
Congress does not broaden the federal insurance programs, the
entire nation benefits from avoiding the costs of casualty losses
through lower insurance premiums, less risk to the insurance
industry, smaller losses, and quicker recovery for affected
individuals. Congress should consider tax credits to stimulate
mitigation measures.

445
See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; I.R.S. Notices 2004-74,
supra note 150; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150.
446
Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25.
447
Id.
448
Id.
449
See H.R. 4973, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2006).
450
Barreto statement, supra note 342, at 4.
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A window (perhaps three to five years) of tax credits to
homeowners and businesses would incentivize taxpayers to
invest now rather than later. Congress could offer a credit to
match a proportionate share of amounts invested in approved
mitigation techniques. The proportionate share could vary
based upon income. (For example, a dollar for dollar match up
to a predetermined limit for taxpayers earning less than
$20,000, ramping down to a ten or twenty percent match for
taxpayers earning over $200,000 (up to the same limited credit
amount).)
This matching formula serves as a substantial incentive
by making mitigation more affordable, especially for the poor.
It is in the government’s interest to match these costs now to
prevent far greater potential costs down the road. After all, “an
The
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”451
government may save considerably on disaster assistance in
the future if precautions are taken now.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The first and foremost lesson from Hurricane Katrina
was “[n]o matter how prepared we think we are, we must work
every day to improve.”452 The 2006 message from the National
Hurricane Center was equally clear: “[P]repare, prepare,
prepare.”453 Will Congress be prepared for future disasters?
Will those affected by the next disasters enjoy the same tax
relief as the victims of the 2005 hurricanes?
For individuals, being prepared can mean the difference
between life and death. Financial preparedness is equally
crucial to an individual’s financial well-being. “For small
business owners, being prepared can mean staying in business
following a disaster.”454 A sound disaster plan can make the
difference between being shut down for a few days and losing
the business.455 Just as each individual and business must be
prepared, Congress must prepare appropriate tax measures
now, instead of responding once the next emergency is
underway.
451
Benjamin Franklin, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 1735, at 1. While the
maxim was used in the context of fire prevention, it holds equally true for other
emergencies.
452
LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 4, at 4.
453
NOAA, supra note 1.
454
Runyan, supra note 158.
455
SBA, FAQs (Disaster Preparedness), supra note 407.
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Standardizing and simplifying the Internal Revenue
Code should benefit all victims, but particularly small
businesses and low to middle-income households.456 Taxes
should not discriminate based on the name of the tragedy.
After all, “One hurricane hitting where you live is enough to
make it a bad season.”457
While the location of the next tragedy, the scope of the
damages, who will be affected, how many will be affected, and
how badly they will be affected may not be predictable, the tax
consequences of the disaster should be both predictable and
transparent. Taxpayers need to prepare financially; they must
know about tax consequences ahead of time to effectively plan.
For example, tax incentives might motivate individuals
and businesses to secure flood insurance or prompt them to
invest in precautionary measures.
If tax-advantaged
catastrophe savings accounts are codified, they can serve as a
repository for “self-insuring” a portion of prospective losses. By
motivating the insurance community, through tax incentives,
to set aside funds dedicated exclusively to national disasters,
the government could help take some of the sting out of the
next major catastrophe.
Although it is too late to redress past inequitable tax
treatment (favoring victims of some tragedies over others),458 if
there is to be any equity for future victims, Congress must act
now to standardize and optimize treatment of disaster victims
in the tax code. The tax relief proposed in this article satisfies
the need for both horizontal and vertical equity among
taxpayers and reflects America’s historic compassion to help
those in need. Preserving the most cost-effective and beneficial
measures and trimming expensive and unrefined aid will
benefit all Americans.

456
For a discussion of the benefits of simplification, see Testimony Before the
Subcomm on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (April 6,
2006) (prepared statement of Dennis B. Drapkin, Chairman, American Bar Ass’n,
Section
on
Taxation),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=
printfriendly&id=4836 (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
457
NOAA, supra note 1.
458
Cf. GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 1 (arguing that tax subsidies for lower
Manhattan after 2001 terrorist attacks may be desirable means of compensating
victims for catastrophic losses).

